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ANTITRUST POLICY AFTER CHICAGO 
Herbert Hovenkamp* 
The so-called "Chicago School" of analysis has achieved ascendancy 
within the fields of antitrust policymaking and scholarship. In this Article, 
Professor Hovenkamp predicts that flaws in the Chicago model's basic 
premises will one day cause it to be eclipsed, just as previously ascendant 
doctrines have been eclipsed. Professor Hovenkamp enumerates and ex-
pands upon a list of criticisms of the Chicago School's neoclassical effi-
ciency model grouping the arguments within two categories: criticisms 
from "outside" and "inside" the model From "outside" the model Pro-
fessor Hovenkamp disputes the premises that policymakers can know 
enough about the real world to make truly efficient decisions, that anti-
trust law can pursue the single goal of efficiency and remain consistent 
with other legal policies, and that the antitrust laws' legislative history re-
flects an exclusive concern with efficiency. Furthermore, from "inside" 
the model the author argues that even if it were appropriate for antitrust 
policy to take account only of efficiency concerns, the Chicago School's 
neoclassical efficiency model is not sophisticated enough to account for 
real world behavior. He demonstrates that Chicago scholars' erroneous 
characterization of markets as static leads them to underestimate the im-
portance and severity of strategic behavior. Professor Hovenkamp rein-
forces his critique of the Chicago School model by describing two 
previously overlooked forms of strategic behavior and by showing how such 
behavior can and does undermine the model's reliance on the market. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If one hundred years of federal antitrust policy have taught us any-
thing, it is that antitrust is both political and cyclical. Almost every 
political generation has abandoned the policy of its predecessors in 
favor of something new. Antitrust policymakers have created the 
common law school, 1 the rule of reason school, 2 the monopolistic 
• Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. - Ed. 
The author admits a great admiration for Chicago School antitrust policy, and confesses that 
he has been a fellow traveler for some time. Nevertheless, he believes that the Chicago School 
generally did a much better job of defending its position when it was a tiny squad of embattled 
outsiders instead of a triumphant division. Those who no longer need to defend themselves, 
don't. 
1. For example, see Judge Taft's opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 
F. 271, 279-83 (6th Cir. 1898), affd., 115 U.S. 211 (1899), applying common law principles to 
interpretation of "contract in restraint of trade" under the Sherman Act. Also, see Justice 
Holmes's opinion in Swift and Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905), applying common 
law attempt principles to the Sherman Act. See generally Baxter, Separation of Powers, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TExAS L. REv. 
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competition (New Deal) school,3 the workable competition school,4 
the liberal school, 5 and the law and economics, or Chicago, school. 6 
Each of these schools left an impression that affected antitrust pol-
icy indefinitely, although some continue to have a far more visible in-
fluence than others. The common law may continue to guide antitrust 
decisionmaking, but in most cases the evidence is hard to find. 7 The 
rule of reason is very much with us, however, and continues to play a 
large and expanding role in antitrust adjudication. 8 The theory of mo-
nopolistic competition has frequent revivals, most recently in the 
ready-to-eat breakfast cereals case.9 Both the workable competition 
thesis10 and the liberal theory11 are currently in disrepute among those 
661 (1982); Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 135, 
136-40 (1984). 
2. See Chief Justice White's opinion in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-67 
(1911), adopting a rule of reason, apparently for all litigation under the Sherman Act. The histor· 
ical development of the rule of reason is recounted in A. BICKEL & B. SCHMIDT, THE JUDICIARY 
AND REsPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT, 1910-21, at 86-199 (9 Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1984). 
3. See E. CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (7th ed. 1956) (1st 
ed. 1933). For the relationship between the theory of monopolistic competition and Depression· 
era antitrust policy, see Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of Models: The Faus-
tian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEO. L.J. 1511, 1541-47 (1984). See also E. HAWLEY, THE 
NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN EcONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 13, 
35, 40-48, 297-99 (1966). 
4. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE 
ANTITRUST LAWS 320-38 (1955) [hereinafter cited as 1955 COMMITTEE REPORT] (proposing 
that antitrust policy be guided by a theory of "workable competition"); see also Clark, Toward a 
Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. REV. 241 (1940). Clark's theory of "workable 
competition" was intended to be a rejection of Chamberlin's theory of monopolistic competition, 
under which public policy efforts to improve real-world competition by such devices as the anti· 
trust laws were deemed to be ineffectual. 
5. The "liberal school" here refers to the antitrust policy developed by the Warren Court 
during the 1950s and 1960s. See text at notes 28-37 infra. 
6. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (1978); 
Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979). 
7. But see United States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114, 1118-20 (5th Cir. 1984)(apply-
ing common law principles to the offense of attempt to monopolize), cert. dismissed per stipula-
tion, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1985). Today, discussion about the "common law" nature of antitrust refers 
to the power of the courts to devise specific rules that interpret a broadly worded statute. The 
phrase is not generally used to suggest that federal antitrust law today follows the common law of 
restraints on trade. See generally Baxter, supra note 1; Easterbrook, supra note 1. 
8. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Board of Regents, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); Broad· 
cast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). See generally Blake, The 
Rule of Reason and Per Se Offenses in Antitrust Law (Columbia University Center for Law & 
Economics Studies, working paper No. 10, 1984). 
However, some Chicago School writers argue that the dichotomy between per se and rule of 
reason analysis is wrongheaded and should be replaced by an analysis that develops through a 
series of presumptions. Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 153-68. See generally Easterbrook, The 
Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook, Limits]. 
9. In re Kellogg Co., 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982). 
10. See, e.g., G. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 12 (1968) (criticizing the 
"workable competition" thesis). 
11. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 198-216. 
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of the dominant (Chicago) school. Nevertheless, one can find any 
number of people who adhere to them, particularly to the liberal 
theory. 12 
The life of a school of antitrust policy is like the life of a scientific 
model. 13 First the model experiences a period when only one or a few 
people dare to propose it. These people may be treated as charlatans 
by those who work within the consensus model. 14 Later a break-
through or discovery, or perhaps a series of discoveries, occurs that 
both discredits the accepted model and makes the new model seem far 
more palatable. Then the new model achieves consensus, and most 
people in the scholarly community try to jump on the wagon - to do 
research that will validate the model, or that is guided by the frame-
work established by the model. 15 
The model determines "relevance."16 _Relevant evidence is that 
which is explained by or "fits into" the existing model. Irrelevant evi-
dence is that which cannot be accounted for by the model. Within the 
neoclassical market efficiency model,17 for example, evidence that a 
particular practice distributes wealth in a certain way or that a rule 
increases the opportunities for small business is generally irrelevant, 
because the model does not take such values into account. The model 
purports to distinguish only the efficient from the inefficient, without 
reference to distributional consequences. If ''justice" has anything at 
all to do with the way wealth is distributed, then the model is unable 
to distinguish the just from the unjust. 18 
The Chicago School model of antitrust policy dictates that alloca-
tive efficiency as defined by the market should be the only goal of the 
antitrust laws.19 Within that paradigm even evidence derived from the 
12. See Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 1140 
(1981); Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 1051 (1979); Schwartz, 
"Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979). 
13. See generally T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) 
(describing the process by which scientific thought evolves). 
14. Id. at 10-34. For example, Posner notes that early Chicago School theorists were re-
garded by outsiders as a "lunatic fringe." Posner, supra note 6, at 931. 
15. T. KUHN, supra note 13, at 10-34. 
16. Id. at 15. 
17. In this article the term "neoclassical market efficiency model" refers to the price theory 
· of the Chicago School, which is the price theory that dominates American antitrust policy today. 
A good brief overview of the theory is R. BORK, supra note 6, at 90-133. See also H. 
HOVENKAMP, EcONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1-36 (1985). 
18. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 90 ("Antitrust •.. has nothing to say about the ways 
prosperity is distributed or used."); see also Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust 
Laws, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 16-26 (1982). For criticism of this view, see text at notes 155-
65 infra. 
19. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 91; R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PER· 
SPECTIVE 4 (1976). 
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legislative history of the antitrust laws is unimportant, unless to show 
that the legislative history supports or undermines the model. If the 
latter, the preservation of the model requires that the legislative his-
tory of the antitrust laws be deemed irrelevant to their current 
interpretation. 20 
The market efficiency model for antitrust policy is very powerful, 
and is as appealing intellectually as any of its predecessors. One of the 
strongest elements in its appeal has been its advocacy of expertise 
outside the legal profession. Today more than ever antitrust deci-
sionmakers have been forced to submit their views to another group of 
specialists - economists - for evaluation.21 Antitrust academia, the 
antitrust bar, and the federal judiciary are filled with people who have 
made serious efforts to learn about price theory and industrial 
organization. 
This article begins with the premise that nothing - not even an 
intellectual structure as imposing as the Chicago School - lasts for-
ever. In fact, a certain amount of stagnation is already apparent. 
Most of the creative intellectual work of the Chicago School has al-
ready been done - done very well, to be sure. The new work too 
often reveals the signs of excessive self-acceptance, particularly of 
quiet acquiescence in premises that ought to be controversial.22 
Today the cutting edge of antitrust scholarship is coming, not from 
protagonists of the Chicago School, but rather from its critics.23 The 
critics began as most critics of a model do, first by making refinements 
20. See text at notes 167-97 infra. 
21. For example, see ANTrrRUST POLICY IN TRANSITION: THE CONVERGENCE OP LA w 
AND EcoNOMICS (E. Fox & J. Halverson eds. 1984). 
22. See, e.g., Landes, Optional Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 
(1983) (assuming that economic efficiency should be the basis for damages measurement, 
notwithstanding that § 4 of the Clayton Act appears to mandate a compensatory basis for mea-
surement - three times the damages "by him [the plaintift] sustained"). See also Easterbrook, 
The Limits of Antitrust, supra note 8, at 2-3 (assuming without proof that overdeterrence is more 
socially costly than underdeterrence). For an alternative view, that overdeterrence is probably 
beneficial in highly concentrated markets, while underdeterrence is probably beneficial in com-
petitive markets, see Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 
89 YALE L.J. 213, 222-39 (1979). Finally, see Baxter, Reflections Upon Professor Williamson's 
Comments, 27 ST. Loms U. L.J. 315 (1983) (acknowledging that industrial organization theory 
may have discerned ways in which strategic firm behavior is anticompetitive, but arguing that 
courts should not consider such questions). 
23. See Dixit, A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers, 10 BELL J. EcoN. 
20 (1979); Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 CoLUM. L. REV. 515 
(1985); Markovits, The Limits to Simplifying Antitrust: A Reply to Professor.Easterbrook, 63 
TEXAS L. REV. 41 (1984); Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, AM. ECON. REV., May 1979, at 
335; Salop & Scheirman, Raising Rivals' Costs, AM. EcoN. REV., May 1983, at 267; Scherer, The 
Economics of Vertical Restraints, 52 ANTrrRUST L.J. 687 (1983); Wentz, Mobility Factors in 
Antitrust Cases: Assessing Market Power in Light of Conditions Affecting Entry and Fringe Ex-
pansion, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1545 (1982); Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement: Where It's Been, 
Where It's Going, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J. 289 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Antitrust 
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in the given model, then by uncovering some major anomalies, and 
finally, in some cases, even by considering alternatives to the classical 
market efficiency model. This process is only barely underway, and 
this essay will do no more than carry it marginally toward its goal. 
However, the initial premise of this paper cannot easily be refuted: the 
Chicago School, just as its predecessors, is mortal. 
II. ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN FEDERAL ANTITRUST 
POLICY: 1890-1980 
Chicago School antitrust advocates sometimes say that courts, the 
Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice first devel-
oped an "economic approach" to antitrust in the early 1980s.24 Crit-
ics of the Chicago School likewise suggest that "economists are kings" 
over antitrust policymaking in the 1980s in a way that they were not 
during earlier periods.25 The impression created by these statements is 
that antitrust policymakers somehow discovered economics at the 
time of the Chicago School revolution in antitrust policy. 
Such a conclusion must rest on one of two alternative premises. 
Either (1) economic theory had nothing useful to say about antitrust 
policy until the 1970s, or (2) although economists in earlier periods 
had something to say about antitrust policy, the policymakers paid 
little or no attention, but developed their policies in a vacuum that was 
free of theoretical economics. Only an extreme form of historical my-
opia will admit the first premise. While the second should perhaps be 
taken a little more seriously, its truth is far from clear. 
Much of the criticism that American antitrust policy has histori-
cally been economically unsophisticated is really a criticism that the 
earlier policy employed a different economic model than the model 
that is currently in vogue. In that case the Chicago School "revolu-
Enforcement]; Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 
284 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Williamson, Predatory Pricing]. 
The exchange in the St. Louis University Law Journal between Professor Baxter (then head of 
the Antitrust Division), supra note 22, and Professor Williamson, supra, is instructive. In it both 
Williamson, a critic of the Chicago School, and Baxter, a proponent, appear to agree that within 
the disciplines of price theory and industrial organization traditional Chicago School scholarship 
is giving way to more complex theories designed to account for strategic behavior. The two 
authors differ only on the question whether courts should accommodate the new scholarship. 
Courts ignored the Chicago School for thirty years. Mr. Baxter appears to believe that post-
Chicago economic scholarship should be treated the same way. 
24. See Gerhart, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Analysis: the (Near) Triumph of the Chi-
cago School, 19.82 SUP. Cr. REv. 319; Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: 
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 5, 12-13 (1977). 
25. See Baker & Blumenthal, The 1982 Guidelines and Preexisting Law, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 
311, 317-21 (1983); Fox, Introduction, The 1982 Merger Guidelines: When Economists Are 
Kings?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 281, 281-83, 296-99 (1983). 
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tion" in antitrust policy is much less far-reaching than its supporters 
suggest, although its importance should not be understated. Antitrust 
policymakers did not first develop an "economic approach" in the late 
1970s or early 1980s.26 They simply changed economic models. This 
was hardly the first time that such a change occurred, and at least one 
earlier change was just as sudden and dramatic.21 
The Chicago School has been particularly relentless in its criticism 
of the antitrust policy of the Warren Era, which has been presented as 
the antithesis of sound economic thinking in antitrust policy.28 Yet 
despite all that has been said about the lack of sophistication or even 
the hostility toward economics manifested by Warren Court and Ei-
senhower administration antitrust policy, that policy was in fact very 
much informed by academic economists. The price theory and indus-
trial organization that dominated the academic study of economics in 
the 1960s were simply quite different from the dominant economic ide-
ology of the 1980s. 
For example, Harvard economist Joe S. Bain, who exercised a 
strong influence on federal antitrust policy in the 1960s and 1970s, 
based his relatively prointerventionist theories on three important eco-
nomic premises. The first was that economies of scale were not sub-
stantial in most markets and dictated truly anticompetitive 
concentration levels in only a small number of industries.29 As a re-
sult, many industries contained larger firms and were more concen-
trated than necessary to achieve optimal productive effi.ciency.30 The 
second was that barriers to entry by new firms were very large and 
26. The date chosen for the adoption of an "economic approach" by antitrust policymakers 
is more or less arbitrary. The most plausible candidates are 1977, the year of the Supreme 
Court's decision in Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (adopting a rule of 
reason for vertical nonprice restraints), and 1981, when President Reagan took office and named 
William F. Baxter to head the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 
27. That change occurred in 1935 and 1936, and was in large part prompted by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which struck 
down the National Industrial Recovery Act. Under the Act competing firms were strongly en-
couraged to "cooperate" with one another in the development of "codes of fair competition," and 
enforcement of the antitrust laws was nearly suspended. After the Schechter case, however, the 
Roosevelt administration suddenly shifted positions and adopted a policy of aggressive enforce· 
ment of the antitrust laws, based largely on 1930s theories of oligopoly performance in concen· 
trated markets subject to substantial product differentiation. See E. HAWLEY, supra note 3, at 
283-380. 
28. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 6, at 201-16. 
29. See Bain, Economies of Scale, Concentration, and the Condition of Entry in Twenty Man· 
ufacturing Industries, 44 AM. EcoN. REV. 15, 38 (1954). 
30. ]. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW CoMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND CONSEQUENCES 
IN MANUFACTURING INDUSfRIES 53-113 (1956); Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Con· 
centration: American Manufacturing, 1936-40, 65 Q. J. EcoN. 293 (1951); see also Stigler, Mo-
nopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, AM. EcoN. REv., May 1950, at 23. 
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could easily be manipulated by dominant firms.31 The third was that 
the noncompetitive performance (pricing above marginal cost) associ-
ated with oligopoly began to occur at relatively low concentration 
levels.32 
The combination of these views created an antitrust policy that 
was quite concerned with deconcentrating oligopolistic markets and, 
to a degree, with protecting small firms from larger rivals, generally on 
the theory that a large number of small firms would yield lower prices 
than a relatively small number of larger firms.33 To be sure, the War-
ren Court did not always follow this reasoning. For example, some of 
its merger decisions appear to identify low prices, rather than oligop-
oly or large firm dominance, as the primary "evil" at which the anti-
trust laws were targeted.34 The Justice Department's enforcement 
policy manifested in the 1968 Merger Guidelines was not so careless, 
however.35 Today no one can say that those guidelines reflect an ap-
proach that was any less "economic" than the approach taken by the 
1984 Merger Guidelines.36 The 1968 guidelines simply reflect the aca-
demic thinking of the 1960s, in which product differentiation, indus-
trial concentration, barriers to entry, and large firm dominance rather 
than tacit collusion were the principal areas of economic concern for 
the competitive process. 37 All of these were explicitly "economic" 
31. J. BAIN, supra note 30, at 1-42. Bain identified product differentiation as one of the most 
common ways that incumbent firms could manipulate the market to make entry more difficult. 
Id. at 114-43. 
32. J. BAIN, supra note 30, at 1-42. 
33. The best statement of the policy is c. KAYSEN & D. TuRNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN 
EcONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1959), which relied heavily on Bain's work. See also Turner, 
The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to 
Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655 (1962). 
34. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) (holding that Con-
gress wanted amended § 7 of the Clayton Act to be used "to promote competition through the 
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses"). For that reason, a merger that lowered a 
firm's costs and thereby injured smaller competitors should be condemned. The Supreme Court 
applied similar analysis in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), and in FTC 
v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
35. See 1968 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 2 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 11 4510 
[hereinafter cited as 1968 Merger Guidelines]. 
36. 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,837 [hereinafter 
cited as 1984 Merger Guidelines]; see R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, Eco-
NOMIC NOTES, AND OTHER MATERIALS 60 (2d ed. Supp. 1984) (suggesting that the 1984 Justice 
Department Merger Guidelines represent a "great advance in econoinic sophistication over the 
1968 guidelines"). 
37. The most noteworthy difference between the Justice Department's 1968 Merger Guide-
lines and the 1984 Merger Guidelines is not that the former adopted the four-firm concentration 
ratio (CR4) as an index of market concentration, while the latter adopted the Hirfindahl-Hirsch-
man Index (HHI). Both indexes have been around since before the 1968 guidelines were drafted 
and are simply alternative ways of measuring market concentration. See, e.g., Hirschman, The 
Paternity of an Index, 54 AM. EcoN. REv. 761 (1964); Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. 
EcoN. 44, 55 (1964). A much more important distinction between the two sets of guidelines is 
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concerns - howbeit concerns that achieved prominence within a dif-
ferent economic model than the one that dominates antitrust policy 
today. 
Even the 1950s and 1960s were not the first decades that economic 
models influenced antitrust policy.38 Federal antitrust policy con-
tained a strong economic element much earlier. In fact, one must go 
all the way back to the first thirty years of antitrust enforcement to 
find a policy that can reasonably be characterized as having little or no 
economic content. 39 
When the Sherman Act was first passed in 1890, most (but not 
al1)40 economists condemned it as at best irrelevant to the problem of 
the trusts and at worst as harmful to the economy because the statute 
would prohibit firms from combining to take advantage of economies 
of scale made possible by recent technological development.41 During 
this period, roughly 1890-1930, American economists developed a set 
of theories that found consumer benefits in concentration and large 
firms probably to a greater extent than did any economic model until 
the rise of the Chicago School. 42 
the degree of danger that the Justice Department perceived in high market concentration. The 
1968 Guidelines reflect the Justice Department's perception that concentrated markets discour-
aged vigorous price competition and encouraged other kinds of conduct, "such as use of ineffi-
cient methods of production or excessive promotional expenditures, of an economically 
undesirable nature." 1968 Merger Guidelines, supra note 35. On the other hand, virtually the 
only perceived danger under the 1984 guidelines is collusion. Another important difference be-
tween the two sets of guidelines is the concentration level at which mergers are considered to be 
dangerous. The 1968 guidelines, following Bain, regarded mergers as anticompetitive at gener-
ally lower concentration levels than do the 1984 guidelines. 
38. For some insights into pre-1950s models, see Rowe, supra note 3. 
39. Even in the early period the government may have followed prevailing economic theocy. 
During that time the majority of economists believed that the antitrust laws were useless or 
perhaps even harmful, because they would deprive firms of the ability to take full advantage of 
scale economies. The government, for its part, brought vecy few antitrust cases during the first 
decade after the Sherman Act was passed. See w. LETWIN, LAW AND EcONOMIC POLICY IN 
AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTrrRusr ACT 106-42 (1965). Some Chicago 
School antitrust scholars have argued that the framers of the Sherman Act essentially had the 
market efficiency model in mind in 1890. See text at notes 179-80 infra. 
40. One important economist who took exception to the consensus was Heney Carter Ad-
ams. See Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action, 1 PUBLICATIONS AM. ECON. A. 465 
(1887). Adams argued for a certain amount of government intervention against monopolies; 
however, he believed it should be directed at monopoly conduct rather than market structure, 
which Adams believed was predetermined by economies of scale. 
41. See Hatfield, The Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. EcoN. 1, 6 (1899) (noting that a 
consensus of economists at this important meeting believed that the problems of high concentra· 
tion and large firm size at which the Sherman Act was directed were the "outgrowth of natural 
industrial evolution," and were therefore efficient). The proceedings of this meeting were pub-
lished as CHICAGO CoNFERENCE ON TRusrs: SPEECHES, DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS (1900). 
42. In large part the free market bias of economists during this period may be attributed to 
the powerful influence of Alfred Marshall, whose Principles of Economics (1890) restored neo-
classical price theocy to its most eminent position since the publication of Adam Smith's Wealth 
of Nations (1776). For a summary of economists' typical attitudes toward the Sherman Act and 
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The First New Deal43 saw substantial inroads of economic theory 
into antitrust policy44 - but at that time the dominant economic the-
ory was dedicated to the Progressive Era economic proposition that 
regulation, including self-regulation and creative cooperation, would 
be much more efficient than ruthless competition in increasing Ameri-
can wealth.45 Only after the National Industrial Recovery Act was 
declared unconstitutional did the administration bring in a different 
group of economists who were much more aggressive in their antitrust 
enforcement goals. 46 Their work became the basis for the "workable 
competition" theory that dominated antitrust policy in the 1950s. 
The workable competition theory was probably the first economic 
model expressly designed to be a tool of antitrust policy. Economist 
J.M. Clark, who first developed the theory, 47 accepted the most impor-
tant premise of the far more academic monopolistic competition 
school:48 that widespread product differentiation limits the degree to 
which firms in the same product market compete with one another 
and therefore permits them to raise price above marginal cost. How-
ever, from that point Clark attempted to define an amount of competi-
tion that could realistically be achieved by a real world enforcement 
· policy. 
Antitrust policymakers were happy to accept Clark's call for an 
antitrust policy that would respond to a complex economic model. 
The 1955 report of the Attorney General's National Committee to 
Study the Antitrust Laws relied heavily on Clark's workable competi-
tion thesis.49 The Committee concluded that the theory of workable 
existing antitrust enforcement during this period, see J.D. Cl.ARK, THE FEDERAL TRusr POL-
ICY 100-01 (1931); F. F'ETIER, MODERN EcONOMIC PROBLEMS 533 (2d ed. 1922); S. FINE, 
LAISSEZ FAIRE AND THE GENERAL-WELFARE STATE 139, 337 (1956). 
Even liberal and progressive economists such as Richard T. Ely and Charles Van Hise were 
pessimistic about the federal antitrust laws. Both believed that economies of scale, particularly in 
innovation, necessitated the growth of monopoly in high technology markets. Antitrust would 
deprive firms in these markets from achieving optimal productive efficiency. Both Ely and Van 
Hise preferred a regime of broad federal price regulation rather than enforced "competition" 
along the lines of the neoclassical model. See R. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRusrs (1900); C. 
v AN HISE, CoNCENTRATION AND CONTROL: A SOLUTION TO THE TRusr PROBLEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 76-87, 255-56 (1912). 
43. I am referring to the period from the election of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932 until the 
National Industrial Recovery Act was struck down in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 
295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
44. See E. HAWLEY, supra note 3, at 41-46. 
45. Id. For an analysis of the perceived dichotomy between "competition" and "coopera-
tion" during this period, see Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEXAS L. 
REV., in press. 
46. Id. at 47-52, 283-303. 
47. Clark, supra note 4. 
48. E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 3. 
49. 1955 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 318-39. The report defined "workable com-
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competition would operate as a kind of practical theory of "second 
best" that would permit antitrust enforcers to consider the differences 
between the economic model of perfect competition and the apparent 
degree of competition that existed in the real world. so The result was 
a state of affairs that was not capable of being precisely modeled, and 
this may explain the difficulties that some later economists had with 
the concept of workable competition.st In short, the concept of work-
able competition was an early attempt to create an economic model 
that took into account such real world market imperfections as econo-
mies of scale, information failures, and transaction costs. The goal of 
antitrust policy within this model was to discern areas in which legal 
rules or administrative controls could encourage a market to perform 
more similarly to the perfect competition model. s2 
Clearly, antitrust policymakers did not first discover economic the-
petition" as "the economists' attempt to identify the conditions which could provide appropriate 
leads for policy in assuring society the substance of the advantages which competition should 
provide." Id. at 320. 
The Committee was chaired by Stanley N. Barnes and S. Chesterfield Oppenheim and in-
cluded many economists and antitrust lawyers. The report is analyzed in T. KOVALEFF, BUSI· 
NESS AND GOVERNMENT DURING THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE 
ANTITRusr POLICY OF THE ANTITRusr DIVISION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT 17-48 (1980). 
See also Hovenkamp, Book Review, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 755 (1982) (reviewing Kovaleft). 
SO. The theory of second-best suggests that in a world in which a certain amount of monop-
oly power (positive deviations from marginal cost pricing) is pervasive, an increase of competi· 
tion in one area will not necessarily improve general welfare, for the increase may be more than 
offset by decreases elsewhere. Clark recognized already in 1940 that 
[i]f there are, for example, five conditions, all of which are essential to perfect competition, 
and the first is lacking in a given case, then it no longer follows that we are necessarily better 
off for the presence of any one of the other four. In the absence of the first, it is a priori quite 
possible that the second and third may become positive detriments; and a workably satisfac-
tory result may depend on achieving some degree of "imperfection" in these other two 
factors. 
Clark, supra note 4, at 242. For further elaboration of the conditions that would facilitate the 
achievement of workable competition within Clark's model, see Sosnick, A Critique of Concepts 
of Workable Competition, 72 Q. J. EcoN. 380 (1958). 
For technical development of the theory of second-best, see Lipsey & Lancaster, The General 
Theory of Second-Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STUD. 11 (1956). For less technical descriptions of the 
theory, see H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 37-39; F. SCHERER, INDUsrRIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND EcONOMIC PERFORMANCE 24-29 (2d ed. 1980). Clark was perhaps the first 
economist to recognize the theory of second-best and deal with some of its ramifications. See C. 
FERGUSON, A MACROECONOMIC THEORY OF WORKABLE COMPETITION 27 (1964). 
51. One example is George Stigler, who faulted the principle of workable competition for not 
containing any mechanism for quantifying how much competition is "workable." G. STIGLER, 
supra note 10, at 12; see also 1955 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 4, at 339 (noting that some 
members of the Attorney General's committee made a similar criticism). 
52. See Markham, An Alternative Approach to the Concept of Workable Competition, 40 AM. 
EcoN. REv. 49 (1950): 
An industry may be judged to be workably competitive when, after the structural character· 
istics of its market and the dynamic forms that shaped them have been thoroughly ex-
amined, there is no clearly indicated change that can be effected through public policy 
measures that would result in greater social gains than social losses. 
Id. at 361. 
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ory in the last decade. More accurately, they changed theories. How-
ever, the statement that recent antitrust policy was the first to develop 
an "economic approach" may mean that antitrust policymakers have 
only recently relied exclusively on economics. That is, earlier courts 
and enforcers may have recognized economic goals for antitrust pol-
icy, but they mixed these goals in some way with distributive goals. 
After the 1977 Sylvania53 decision, or perhaps after the 1981 appoint-
ment of Mr. Baxter to head the Antitrust Division of the Justice De-
partment, 54 however, antitrust policymakers may first have begun to 
consider efficiency goals exclusively. If that characterization is cor-
rect, one can say with some meaning that the rise of Chicago School 
antitrust policy represents the beginning of an "economic approach" 
- that is, an approach concerned exclusively with efficiency. 
This view is subject to both an objection and a qualification, how-
ever. The objection is that it is probably untrue. Although the Justice 
Department may be going through a period in which it recognizes effi-
ciency as the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws, 55 the Supreme Court 
has not adopted such a general antitrust policy, and some of its recent 
decisions seem inconsistent with such a policy.56 
The qualification is much more fundamental and goes to the nature 
of the relationship between economic theory and public policymaking. 
Economists have long stated that theoretical economic models cannot 
evaluate a state of affairs on the basis of how its wealth is distributed. 
These models are capable only of distinguishing the efficient from the 
inefficient. 57 However, for just as long, economists - even free mar-
53. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
54. See note 26 supra. 
55. However, this author knows of no official policy statement of either the Department of 
Justice or the Federal Trade Commission stating that distributive concerns are irrelevant to anti-
trust policy. Furthermore, the Justice Department continues to recognize distributive concerns 
in antitrust law when those concerns are clearly expressed in congressional policy. For example, 
the Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines continue to recognize the failing company 
defense in merger cases, even though the defense has traditionally been viewed as not based on 
efficiency but rather on distributive concerns. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 36, at 
26,837; P. AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRusr LAW~ 925.1 (Supp. 1986) (forthcoming). 
However, for a recent argument that even the failing company defense has a basis in efficiency, 
see Campbell, The Efficiency of the Failing Company Defense, ·63 TEXAS L. REv. 251 (1984). 
For responses, see Friedman, Untangling the Failing Company Doctrine, 64 TEXAS L. REV., in 
press; McChesney, Defending the Failing-Firm Defense, 65 NEB. L. REv. 1 (1986). 
56. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) (condemning vertical 
restraints by a nonmonopolist, in spite of a substantial Chicago School argument that the 
nonmonopolist cannot create market power by means of vertical restrictions); Easterbrook, supra 
note 1; Hovenkamp, Vertical Restrictions and Monopoly Power. 64 B.U. L. REv. 521 (1984); see 
also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Socy., 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (condemning a maximum 
price fixing agreement under the per se rule, in the face of substantial evidence that the arrange-
ment was efficient). 
57. However, the distinction between efficiency and distribution of wealth was not clearly 
established until the ordinalist revolution in the 1930s. The ordinalists generally attacked the 
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ket economists - have recognized an important difference between 
theoretical economics and public policymaking, particularly if the pol-
icies are being made in a democratic State. 
The public purpose of theoretical economics is not to eliminate dis-
tributive justice as a public policy concern.58 Rather, it is to enable 
policymakers to make some judgments about the cost or effectiveness 
of a particular policy. The relative weight to be given to efficiency 
concerns in policymaking varies with the ability of the relevant eco-
nomic model to identify efficient policies in the real world. If the "effi-
cient" solution to a policy problem is clear, and the degree to which 
alternative solutions deviate from the efficient solution is also quite 
clear, then policymakers are likely to weigh efficiency concerns heav-
ily. These efficiency concerns will trump competing distributive con-
cerns unless those concerns are very powerful. 
On the other hand, if the application of the economic model to real 
world policymaking is not particularly clear, or if the model is very 
complex, then the "efficient" solution to a real world problem will not 
always emerge as obvious. In that case, distributive or political con-
cerns, which are always more or less obvious, will weigh much more 
heavily.59 For example, if the relevant economic model does not re-
veal unambiguously that big business is more efficient than small busi-
ness, but the small business lobby is very powerful, a legislature is 
likely to be influenced very strongly by the lobby. 
One important difference between the neoclassical market effi-
ciency model and earlier economic models is that the neoclassical 
model claims a much greater ability to distinguish between efficient 
and inefficient policies. In this respect, the neoclassical model's largest 
virtue is its simplicity. The monopolistic competition model that was 
created by Chamberlin, and which influenced antitrust policy during 
the New Deal, was far more complicated and made it far more difficult 
to examine a particular business practice and proclaim it efficient or 
notion that one could evaluate wealth distributions on the basis of interpersonal comparisons of 
utilities. See text at notes 113-22 infra. 
58. See W. SHEPHERD, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 5-6 (7th ed. 1985). However, 
some members of the Chicago School might disagree. See Posner, Economics, Politics, and the 
Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 
Posner, The Reading of Statutes] (arguing that "public interest" statutes are efficient); Posner, 
The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. REv. 487 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Posner, The Efficiency Norm] (arguing that the common 
law ought to pursue efficiency as a goal). 
59. The point is made forcefully in M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN 
LAW, 1780-1860, 99-101 (1977). See also Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Mo-
nopoly: An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1263, 1279 (1984); Kainen, Nine-
teenth Century Interpretations of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested 
to Substantive Rights Against the State, 31 BUFFALO L. REV. 381, 396 (1982). 
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inefficient. 6° For example, within that model product differentiation 
could increase consumer choice or encourage innovation; however, it 
could also be a mechanism by which large firms in concentrated indus-
tries avoided price competition with one another.61 Likewise, Joe 
Bain's complicated notion of "conditions of entry" appeared simulta-
neously to praise and condemn economies of scale in the production 
process. On the one hand, economies of scale reduced costs and facili-
tated lower consumer prices. On the other, they made it more difficult 
for new firms to enter the market and, at least in concentrated indus-
tries, facilitated oligopoly behavior. 62 
Within the Chicago School model, on the other hand, both of these 
problems have unambiguous solutions. Product differentiation is al-
most always a blessing for consumers. When it is not, the firms partic-
ipating in the differentiation will be injured rather than benefitted, for 
customers will refuse to buy.63 Likewise, economies of scale are an 
unmixed blessing in all but extremely concentrated markets. 64 In any 
case, the welfare of the small business in such markets should be 
ignored. 
Today, however, antitrust policy is coming increasingly under the 
influence of a "post-Chicago" economics that is both more complex 
and more ambiguous than the Chicago School model. For example, 
within the "strategic behavior" models championed by such people as 
Oliver Williamson and Steven C. Salop, certain phenomena such as 
economies of scale are not necessarily an unmixed blessing. Often 
scale economies can be manipulated by firms in such a way as to per-
mit monopoly pricing while discouraging competitive entry.65 
This new complexity makes it much more difficult for enforcement 
agencies and particularly for courts to make judgments about whether 
a particular practice, such as the creation of a very large plant in a 
market subject to substantial economies of scale, 66 is competitive or 
anticompetitive. The likely effect of such complexity will be to make 
60. E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 3. 
61. Id. at 56-57. 
62. See J. BAIN, supra note 30, at 53-113. 
63. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 312-13. 
64. Id. at 312-29. 
65. See Salop, supra note 23; Williamson, Predatory Pricing, supra note 23; see also Scherer, 
supra note 23, at 697-704 (arguing that frequently vertical price restraints can be inefficient and 
anticompetitive). 
66. See In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (refusing to find an 
illegal attempt to monopolize in du Font's development of a new, lost-cost process for manufac-
turing a chemical, its refusal to license the process to anyone else, and its construction of a plant 
large enough to handle all anticipated demand for the chemical). 
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more room once again for distributive concerns. 67 
III. CHICAGO SCHOOL ANTITRUST AND THE NEOCLASSICAL 
MAR.KET EFFICIENCY MODEL 
Orthodox Chicago School antitrust policy is predicated on two as-
sumptions about the goals of the federal antitrust laws: (1) the best 
policy tool currently available for maximizing economic efficiency in 
the real world is the neoclassical price theory model; and (2) the pur-
suit of economic efficiency should be the exclusive goal of antitrust 
enforcement policy. 
Both of these statements are controversial. The first one raises sev-
eral economic questions about the internal integrity of the neoclassical 
price theory model, as well as questions about the ability of any eco-
nomic model to identify efficient policies in the real world. The second 
statement is probably contrary to the intent of the Congresses that 
drafted the various antitrust laws. These criticisms are addressed in 
subsequent sections of this article. 6s 
No attempt is made here to describe the content of the neoclassical 
market efficiency model. That has been done many times elsewhere. 69 
However, the following discussion summarizes a few of the model's 
basic assumptions and principles that have been particularly impor-
tant in Chicago School antitrust scholarship. 
(1) Economic efficiency, the pursuit of which should be the exclu-
sive goal of the antitrust laws, consists of two relevant parts: allocative 
efficiency and productive efficiency.70 Occasionally practices that in-
crease a firm's productive efficiency reduce the market's allocative effi-
ciency. For example, construction of a large plant and acquisition of a 
large market share may increase a firm's productive efficiency by en-
abling it to achieve economies of scale; however, these actions may 
simultaneously reduce allocative efficiency by facilitating monopoly 
pricing. A properly defined antitrust policy will attempt to maximize 
net efficiency gains. n 
67. There is a different possible response to such complexity: in cases of ambiguity assume 
that a practice is efficient and leave it alone; or alternatively, assume that the effect of an error of 
underdeterrence will be self-correcting, while one of overdeterrence will not be. Under either 
assumption the practice in question should not be condemned. See Easterbrook, Limits, supra 
note 8, at 2-3. The effect of Professor Easterbrook's argument is to say not merely that efficiency 
concerns should always trump distributive concerns in antitrust policy, but that distributive con-
cerns are irrelevant even when efficiency consequences are unknown. 
68. See text at notes 167-97 & 199-318 infra. 
69. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 6, at 90-160; R. POSNER, supra note 19. 
70. The two are distinguished in the discussion at notes 123-42 infra. 
71. In Bork's words, "[t]he whole task of antitrust can be summed up as the effort to improve 
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(2) Most markets are competitive, even if they contain a relatively 
small number of sellers. Furthermore, product differentiation tends to 
undermine competition far less than was form~rly presumed. As a 
result, neither high market concentration nor p~oduct differentiation 
are the anticompetitive problems earlier oligopoly theorists believed 
them to be. 72 
(3) Monopoly, when it exists, tends to be self-correcting; that is, 
the monopolist's higher profits generally attract new entry into the 
monopolist's market, with the result that the monopolist's position is 
quickly eroded. About the best that the judicial process can do is 
hasten l:he correction process. 73 
(4) "Natural" barriers to entry are more imagined than real. As a 
general rule investment will flow into any market where the rate of 
return is high. The one significant exception consists of barriers to 
entry that are not natural - that is, barriers that are created by gov-
ernment itself. In most markets the government would be best off if it 
left entry and exit unregulated. 74 
(5) Economies of scale are far more pervasive than economists 
allocative efficiency without impairing productive efficiency so greatly as to produce either no 
gain or a net loss in consumer welfare." R. BORK, supra note 6, at 91. 
72. The modern Chicago School argument that even highly concentrated markets can per-
form competitively is made in R. BORK, supra note 6, at 179-91; Y. BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, 
MERGERS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1982); J. MCGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRA-
TION (1971). See also Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J. L. & 
EcON. 229 (1977). 
Judge Posner, whose own antitrust policy is distinctively Chicago School, represents the 
"new" Chicago approach which is much more cautious about oligopoly than the approach of 
Brozen, Bork, or McGee. See R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 42-50 (arguing that oligopoly pric-
ing, or tacit collusion, can be a significant problem in concentrated markets). 
The more traditional argument about the danger of oligopoly pricing in concentrated markets 
can be found in C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, supra note 33, at 25-43, which finds a dangerous 
propensity to oligopoly in markets with an eight-firm concentration level (CR8) of 50% - that 
is, a market in which the eight largest firms collectively occupy 50% of the market. Such a 
market could have a largest firm with a market share of as little as 7% and a Hirfandahl-Hirsch-
man Index (HHI) reading as low as 500 or 600. 
The Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines do not follow the extreme Chicago School 
theory, but rather reflect a position between the "diehard" Chicago position and the Kaysen-
Turner position. The guidelines perceive a real danger of oligopoly performance in markets with 
an HHI in excess of 1800. 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 36, at 26,823. · 
The traditional argument that product differentiation is an important mechanism by which 
oligopoly firms facilitate monopoly pricing can be found in J. BAIN, supra note 30, at 114-43. 
However, within the tacit collusion model developed by the Chicago School and written into the 
1984 Merger Guidelines, product differentiation is regarded as making markets more competitive 
by making collusion more difficult. Thus the Justice Department is less likely to challenge a 
merger in a market in which product differentiation is substantial. 1984 Merger Guidelines, 
supra note 36, at 26,833. 
73. See Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 8, at 2 (arguing that in the long run monopolies 
correct themselves; the goal of antitrust is merely to "speed up the arrival of the long run"). 
74. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 310-29; see also Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, 72 AM. EcoN. 
REV. 47 (1982); Weizsacker, A Welfare Analysis of Barriers to Entry, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 399 
(1980). 
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once believed, largely because earlier economists looked only at intra-
plant or production economies, and neglected economies of distribu-
tion. As a result, many more industries than were formerly thought 
may operate most economically only at fairly high concentration 
levels.75 
(6) Business firms are profit-maximizers. That is, their managers 
generally make decisions that they anticipate will make the firm more 
profitable than any alternative decision would. The model would not 
be undermined, however, if it should turn out that many firms are not 
profit maximizers, but are motivated by some alternative goal, such as 
revenue maximization, sales maximization, or "satisficing."76 The in-
tegrity of the market efficiency model requires only that a few firms be 
profit-maximizers. In that case, the profits and market shares of these 
firms will grow at the expense of other firms in the market. 77 
75. The relevant issues are presented in the debate between John S. McGee, representing the 
Chicago position, and Frederic M. Scherer, representing a more traditional position, in INDUS· 
TRIAL CoNCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING 15-113 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann &J. Weston 
eds. 1974). 
76. The term "satisficing" refers to a theory of firm behavior that is contrary to the theory of 
profit maximization adopted by the Chicago School today. A firm "satisfices" when its manage-
ment adopts a certain goal for profits, sales, or market share and then tries to meet the goal but 
not necessarily to exceed it. The theory posits that initially the firm's management witt not be 
inclined to set an extremely high goal, because if they later fail to achieve it they witt appear to 
the stockholders to be failures. Furthermore, once the goal is established the stockholders will 
demand an even higher goal in the future, and that higher goal witt then be more difficult to 
achieve. 
The theory of satisficing is part of a more general theory of the firm, which hypothesizes that 
the owners of capital (stockholders) and the managers of capital may have different motives, and 
that this circumstance makes the firm less efficient than the Chicago School would have us 
believe. 
77. See R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND 
OTHER MATERIALS 855-57 (2d ed. 1981). A good discussion of some of the alternatives to 
profit-maximization is contained in P. AscH, EcONOMIC THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DI· 
LEMMA 90-101 (1970). 
The classic book arguing that the separation of ownership and management in the large busi-
ness corporation has encouraged firms to pursue goals other than profit maximization is A. 
BERLE, JR. & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). See 
the symposium on the Berle and Means study, much of it written from a Chicago School perspec· 
tive, in 26 J. L. & EcoN. 235 (1983). 
Those who believe that most firms are not profit-maximizers have the additional obligation of 
demonstrating why that fact should be relevant to antitrust policy. For one valiant but ulti· 
mately inconclusive attempt to demonstrate such relevance, see Kaplow, supra note 23, at 550· 
52. One possibility, of course, is that the antitrust laws should protect firms from the conse· 
quences of their own inefficient behavior. More plausibly, perhaps the antitrust laws should 
protect outsiders from non-profit-maximizing behavior which injures the actor, but also injures 
those with whom the actor deals. 
The theory that firms are not rational profit-maximizers can be used to provide explanations 
for why firms do certain things that seem irrational. For example, see R. LAFFERTY, R. LANDE, 
& J. KIRKWOOD, IMPACT EVALUATIONS OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RE· 
STRAINTS CASES 11-13 (1984), a recent Federal Trade Commission study of vertical restraints 
finding that at least one firm used vertical restrictions such as resale price maintenance in order 
to gain access to the market - that is, in order to purchase shelf space from retailers who would 
be unwitting to display new merchandise unless they could be guaranteed a high profit. The 
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(7) Antitrust enforcement should be designed in such a way as to 
penalize conduct precisely to the point that it is inefficient, but to tol-
erate or encourage it when it is efficient.78 During the Warren Court 
era, antitrust enforcement was excessive, and often penalized efficient 
conduct.79 
(8) The decision to make the neoclassical market efficiency model 
the exclusive guide for antitrust policy is nonpolitical. 
The "neoclassical" nature of the Chicago School model is well il-
lustrated by the list. The classical model originated before the rise of 
Big Government during the New Deal, and therefore before the State 
had become explicitly involved in the redistribution of social wealth. 
In the eighteenth century the redistribution of wealth was not per-
ceived to be an important state function. 80 Within the market effi-
ciency model, wealth distribution is not an "economic" concern at 
all. 81 
The Chicago School market efficiency model represents an explicit 
rejection of several revisionist economic theories which themselves had 
rejected various elements of the classical model. For example, the the-
ory that firms in highly concentrated markets fail to perform competi-
tively was a qualification of the naive classical model, which treated all 
firms as absolute price takers. 82 Orthodox Chicagoans such as Robert 
study found, however, that the restrictions often persisted after the firm imposing them had 
become well·established and the restrictions actually reduced the firm's profits. Id. at 13. They 
were preserved largely as a result of managerial nonresponsiveness to the changed situation. In 
such a case it appears that the restrictions may have been procompetitive when they were first 
employed by a struggling new entrant, but were inefficient when the firm later became estab-
lished. See also Kaplow, supra note 23, at 551-52 (arguing that firms may employ tying arrange-
ments in order to increase revenues, rather than profits). 
Whether "self-deterring" inefficient conduct should be condemned by the antitrust laws is a 
matter of some controversy. See Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 263, 331-32 (1981) (arguing that predatory pricing should not be condemned until 
after it has succeeded); Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 23, at 312 (suggesting that 
certain instances of failed attempts at predatory pricing could be condemned). 
78. See Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983); 
Schwartz, An Overview of the Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, 68 GEO. L.J. 1075 (1980); see 
also K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANrrrRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND EcONOM-
ICS (1976); H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 379-407. 
79. See Easterbrook, Is There a Ratchet in Antitrust Law?, 60 TEXAS L. REv. 705, 714 n.42 
(1982). 
80. The State may, however, have redistributed wealth through court decisions rather than 
by means of taxation and social programs. See M. HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 99-101. 
81. See text at notes 95-105 infra. 
82. For example, there is no well-developed theory of oligopoly in A. SMITH, supra note 42, 
or in A. MARSHALL, supra note 42. With the exception of Coumot's simple oligopoly theory 
developed in 1838, modem economic theories ofoligopoly are a product of the 1890s and the first 
three decades of the twentieth century. See A. COURNOT, REsEARCHES INTO THE MATHEMATI-
CAL PRINCIPLES OF THE THEORY OF WEALTH (N. Bacon trans. 1897) (1st ed. Paris 1838). In 
chronological order, the major historical contributions to the theory of oligopoly through the 
1930s were Bertrand, Theorie Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale, 1883 JOURNAL DES SA-
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Bork have come close to rejecting the theory of oligopoly outright. 83 
Likewise, the classical model never seriously questioned that the 
firm's principal economic goal is the maximization of its profits. The 
arguments of Berle and Means, 84 who believed that firms do not maxi-
mize profits, were a product of the social science movement and Legal 
Realism of the 1930s and their attendant injection of sociological and 
psychological principles into theories about firm behavior. 85 Within 
the Chicago School model humankind's economic motives "trump" 
any noneconomic motives or else these noneconomic motives are irrel-
evant to the working of the model. 86 
Classical price theory was not heavily concerned with the "condi-
tions of entry" that might permit incumbent firms to earn monopoly 
profits while outsiders were deterred from coming in.87 To the extent 
entry barriers were considered in antitrust economics before the 1950s, 
they were generally "barriers" created by the firms themselves - such 
as covenants not to compete contained in monopolists' purchase and 
sale contracts, lease-only policies and maintenance clauses that alleg-
edly reduced the entry opportunities of independent competitors, 88 or 
entry deterrence through predatory pricing. 89 The notion that the 
market might contain "natural" barriers to entry - that is, barriers 
inherent in the technology or economic structure of the market, and 
not products of the dominant firm's strategic decisionmaking - was 
first elaborated in the 1940s and 1950s.90 One of the significant accom-
plishments of the Chicago School has been its debunking of the notion 
VANIS 499; F. EDGEWORTH, The Pure Theory of Monopoly. in PAPERS RELATING TO POLIT-
ICAL EcoNOMY 111 (1925; originally published in French in 1897); Hotelling, Stability in 
Competition, 39 EcoN. J. 41 (1929); E. CHAMBERLIN, supra note 3. 
83. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 92. 
84. See note 77 supra. 
85. See E. PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & 
THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 86-87 (1973); Kirkendall, A.A. Berle, Jr.: Student of the Corporation, 
1917-1932, 35 Bus. HIST. REV. 43 (1961). 
86. That is, the Chicago School model may allow that occasionally firms or actors in them 
make decisions not motivated by profit-maximization. However, these decisions are either ran-
dom and incapable of being fit into the profit-maximization model, or else they are of no conse-
quence to antitrust policy because they are self-deterring. A firm that does not make profit-
maximizing decisions will, other things being equal, lose market share to one that does. 
87. Likewise, Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics generally assumes that entry is free, 
although he did acknowledge that entry takes time and that monopoly profits could be earned 
during the interval. A. MARSHALL, supra note 42, at 411. 
88. For example, see the consideration of entry barriers in United States v. United Shoe 
Mach., 110 F. Supp. 295, 312-20, 323-25 (D. Mass. 1953), ajfd. percuriam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
89. See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: the Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. L. & EcoN. 137 
(1958). 
90. Principally in J. BAIN, supra note 30. 
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that the world is filled with such "natural" entry barriers.91 Barriers, 
when they exist, are generally artificial, created by either the govern-
ment or else by the dominant, incumbent firms. The Chicago School 
has been quick to recognize the role of the State in the creation of 
entry barriers.92 This paper later argues, however, that Chicagoans 
have often been slow to recognize the strategic creation of entry barri-
ers by incumbent firms. 93 
Perhaps most significantly, Chicago School price theory adheres 
closely to the classical school's strong preference for a "free" market 
- that is, a market left alone by the State and its agencies unless a 
powerful reason exists for interfering.94 Each of the "deviations" from 
the classical model described above - the oligopoly theory, the rejec-
tion of the profit-maximization theory, the entry barrier theory, and 
most importantly, the theory that the State should actively redistribute 
wealth - suggested increasing amounts of government intervention in 
the market process. In rejecting these theories, the Chicago School 
has restored the State to the position of neutral umpire, which it held 
in the classical model 
Finally, a word must be said about the eighth premise in the above 
list - the suggestion that Chicago School antitrust policy is 
"nonpolitical."95 The classical market economist's notion of efficiency 
purports to evaluate states of affairs on the basis of criteria that have 
nothing to do with the way wealth is distributed.96 The principle of 
potential Pareto efficiency or wealth maximization,97 which guides 
Chicago School antitrust analysis, identifies a policy as "efficient" if 
total gains experienced by all those who gain from the policy are 
greater than the total losses experienced by all those who lose. The 
identity of the gainers and losers is irrelevant. If a policy produces 
bigger gains to businesses than it does losses to consumers, the Chi-
cago School would approve the policy as efficient. However, it would 
also approve a policy that produced larger gains to consumers than 
losses to businesses. For this reason the Chicago School ideologist can 
91. The strongest statement of the Chicago School position on entry barriers is probably R. 
BORK, supra note 6, at 310-29. See also Demsetz, supra note 74; R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 59; 
G. STIGLER, supra note 10, at 67-70. 
92. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 310-29. 
93. See text at notes 247-55 infra. 
94. A good statement of the position is Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 8, especially at 2-3, 5-
7, 9. 
95. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 418-25; R. POSNER, THE EcONOMICS OF JUSTICE 92-94 
(1981); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 
YALE L.J. 775, 831-32 (1965). See generally Pitofsky, supra note 12, at 1051. 
96. See generally Hovenkamp, supra note 18. 
97. See text at notes 135-42 infra. 
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argue that he is not taking sides in any political dispute about how 
wealth or entitlements from the State ought to be distributed to con-
flicting interest groups. Such things should always go where they will 
do the most net good. 98 
Outsiders regard this Chicago School claim of freedom from polit-
ical interest with a good deal of skepticism, and some believe it to be 
simple hogwash, or perhaps even a cover for a very strong, probusiness 
political bias that works to the benefit of the rich.99 
The claim that a particular policy has managed to transcend poli-
tics is both appealing and dangerous. Its appeal is that it permits the 
creation of a stable policy that will not change with every substantial 
change in political leadership.100 Antitrust policy has been particu-
larly susceptible to such changes. The danger, on the other hand, is 
that the assertion takes a particular policy out of the political process 
- which means, in the case of a democracy, that it is taken out of the 
democratic process. At the extreme, as is argued below, Chicago 
School policy does exactly that and permits the antitrust policymaker 
to ignore the legislative history of the antitrust laws.101 
To be sure, within the American constitutional system we do at-
tempt to exempt certain claims from democratic control - for exam-
ple, claims involving the right to speak or the right to be free of 
discrimination based on one's race or gender. 102 At one time Ameri-
cans came very close to having a constitutional right to a free market, 
governed pretty much by the neoclassical market efficiency modeI. toJ 
Today, however, a large literature argues that the constitutional doc-
trine of "liberty of contract" was anything but nonpolitical; on the 
contrary, it was a shrewd and calculated use of the political process to 
protect an established set of political interests from being displaced by 
98. See note 58 supra. 
99. Good examples of this kind of criticism are Horwitz, Law and Economics: Science or 
Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 905 (1980); Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement 
Problems: A Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981). For a critique of Kennedy's argument, see 
Markovits, Duncan's Do Nots: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Determination of Legal Entitlements, 
36 STAN. L. REV. 1169 (1984). 
100. Bork, supra note 95, at 832. 
101. See text at notes 167-98 infra. 
102. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND D1srnusr: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 73-104 
(1980). See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
103. See Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (striking down a state minimum wage stat-
ute under the fourteenth amendment); Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking 
down a District of Columbia minimum wage statute under the fifth amendment); Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down under the fourteenth amendment due process 
clause a New York statute that prohibited bakers from working more than ten hours per day or 
sixty hours per week). 
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new political interests.104 
Within the liberal tradition, policy claims have often been de-
fended with an argument that they are nonpolitical - that is, that 
they are somehow· "best" for everyone, and not merely for the interest 
groups making the claims.105 The problem with all such arguments is 
that they can be neither verified nor falsified in any general way. That 
is equally true of the claim that the market efficiency model is 
nonpolitical. Furthermore, it is easy to identify the beneficiaries of 
Chicago School antitrust policy - probably big business, certainly 
vertically integrated firms, perhaps some consumers. Likewise, one 
can predict that small businesses, less efficient firms, and perhaps some 
other consumers will be losers. However, we do not have the tools to 
quantify these gains and losses and net them out over all of society 
except in very easy cases. That leaves us with only the claim to polit-
ical transcendence. Historically, many ideologies have made that 
claim, but none have been able to convince the rest of the world. 
IV. CHICAGO SCHOOL ANTITRUST POLICY: CRITICISM FROM 
OUTSIDE THE MODEL 
The neoclassical market efficiency model is designed to identify the 
prerequisites for efficient market performance, and to explain how de-
viations from perfect competition affect market efficiency. Given cer-
tain assumptions, the model can identify the efficiency consequences of 
certain behavior. For example, given an assumption of zero transac-
tion costs, it predicts that vertical restrictions do not increase a firm's 
ability to earn monopoly profits.106 
The application of the market efficiency model to federal antitrust 
104. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 358·62 (2d ed. 1985); M. 
HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 259·66; P. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES 1918-
1969, at 41-67 (1972); A. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES 
OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887-1895, at 1-81 (1960). Holmes, a contemporary observer, agreed: 
When socialism first began to be talked about, the comfortable classes of the community 
were a good deal frightened. I suspect that this fear has influenced judicial action both here 
and in England .•.. I think that something similar has led people who no longer hope to 
control the legislatures to look to the courts as expounders of the Constitutions, and that in 
some courts new principles have been discovered outside the bodies of those instruments, 
which may be generalized into acceptance of the economic doctrines which prevailed about 
fifty years ago . . . . 
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 467-68 (1897). 
105. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 102; J. ELY, supra note 102; J. RAWLS, A THEORY 
OF JUSTICE (1971); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 13 HARV. L. 
REV. 1 (1959). 
106. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 280-98, 365-81; Posner, The Next Step in Antitrust Treat-
ment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981). The only likely 
exception to the statement in the text is that vertical restrictions may enable a firm to engage in 
price discrimination. See Scherer, supra note 23; Hovenkamp, supra note 56, at 548-59. 
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policy can be faulted for reasons that have nothing to do with the 
internal logic or completeness of the model itself, but rather with the 
premises upon which the model is based and the conclusions that flow 
from it. The model may solve its own problems very well, but never-
th~less not be a very useful guide to antitrust policymaking. Such crit-
icisms can generally be grouped into two types: (1) criticisms that, 
although the model's definition of "efficiency" serves the model's own 
purposes very well, it is different from any concept of "efficiency" that 
realistically can be applied to policymaking in the real world - more 
particularly, in a real world democracy;107 and (2) criticisms that "effi-
ciency" cannot be the only relevant factor in real world policymaking; 
or alternatively, that any argument to that effect rests on premises that 
can be neither verified nor falsified. These are criticisms from 
"outside" the model. 
Any critique of Chicago School antitrust policy that begins from 
these premises must proceed very carefully if antitrust is not to be-
come a meaningless hodge-podge of conflicting, inconsistent, and 
politicized mini-policies. One of the great achievements of Chicago 
School antitrust policy based on the market efficiency model is a claim 
to consistency that cannot be made by any alternative approach that 
requires the "balancing" of competing interests, such as consumer 
welfare and small business welfare. 108 At the same time, the Chicago 
School's claim of a unified, internally consistent, and nonpolitical anti-
trust policy rests on premises whose soundness and application to the 
real world are not self-evident. 
Some of these criticisms are addressed in a substantial economic 
literature, although most have not been developed at any length in 
antitrust scholarship. Economists continue to debate many of these 
issues, however, largely because they involve premises that can be 
neither proven nor disproven, at least not to everyone's satisfaction. 
In short, these issues involve the "statements of faith" made by econo-
mists - statements which often reflect, in Lindley Fraser's words, the 
"individual temperaments" of the people who make them. 109 Every 
economist, including the Chicago School economist, whose commit-
ment to positivist methodology is probably exceeded by no one, l 1o ulti-
mately rests his case on such statements of faith. Even the Chicago 
107. See text at notes 133-54 infra. 
108. For an attempt at such balancing, see Fox, supra note 12. 
109. L. FRASER, EcONOMIC THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE 36 (1937). 
110. Simply, a positivist scientific methodology is one that attempts to avoid metaphysical 
speculation by restricting scientific inquiry to those things that can be either verified or falsified 
from sensory experience. See generally K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 
(1959). 
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School policymaker assumes some things that could be assumed the 
other way by equally rational minds. Importantly, if these premises 
are given up, the Chicago School model falls apart. 
Scientific models - and economic models are no exception - rest 
ultimately on unprovable premises. For example, every model that 
purports to explain the external world rests on the essential premise 
that our senses provide us with accurate information.111 The re-
searcher doing "normal science" - science within the confines of the 
model - generally accepts such premises as given and forgets about 
them.112 Verifying them or disproving them is not a part of her re-
search agenda. 
The public policymaker, however, cannot always make such facile 
assumptions. As a general rule the policymaker assumes the less con-
troversial premises - such as that our senses give us reliable informa-
tion - but is forced by the political process continually to question 
the controversial ones. They are capable of being questioned, people 
question them daily, and because contrary assumptions give very dif-
ferent political results, someone is always around to assert them. 
For example, the Chicago School assumes that welfare can be mea-
sured in constant dollars, so that a transfer of a dollar from a con-
sumer to a monopolist has no weifare implications.113 This 
(unprovable) assumption performs many essential functions in the 
Chicago School framework. Intellectually, it helps the academic em-
ploying the market efficiency model to distinguish between the "dead-
weight loss" and the "wealth transfer" caused by the existence of 
monopoly in the market system.114 Secondly, it permits the Chicago 
School antitrust policymaker to justify a "nonpolitical" approach to 
antitrust, which distinguishes between politically neutral efficiency 
gains, and politicized wealth transfers. 115 Finally, and most impor-
tant, the "constant dollar" welfare assumption forms the chief basis 
for the notion that antitrust should be concerned with the deadweight 
loss caused by monopoly or the costs that the monopolist incurs in 
attaining or maintaining its monopoly position, but should disregard 
the wealth transferred from consumers, suppliers or rivals to the 
monopolizing firm. 116 These principles are absolutely essential to Chi-
111. This concern dominates A.J. Ayer's recent book Philosophy in the Twentieth Century 
(1982). 
112. See T. KUHN, supra note 13, at 10-42. 
113. The assumption is defended in R. POSNER, supra note 95, at 48-87. 
114. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 19-24. 
115. See text at notes 95-105 supra. 
116. For example, see R. BORK, supra note 6, at 111-12. See generally Posner, The Social 
Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcoN. 807 (1975). 
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cago School antitrust analysis. In fact, Chicago School antitrust pol-
icy would lose its identity without them. 
However, the constant dollar welfare assumption is both unprov-
able and quite controversial. One of the most significant debates in 
welfare economics this century has raged between the marginalist, or 
material welfare, school 117 and the ordinalist school. The former be-
lieved that measurement of utility across individuals was both possible 
and essential to policymaking, while the latter believed that such "in-
terpersonal comparisons" of utility were impossible. Chicago School 
welfare economics, which substitutes "wealth maximization" for util-
ity and measures welfare in constant dollars, rests on the ordinalist 
premise that no one can compare the amount of welfare, or satisfac-
tion, that is created by giving a dollar to a poor person, with the 
amount that is created by giving the same dollar to someone who is 
wealthy. Chicago School economic policymaking responds by making 
the assumption Gust as unprovable as the ordinalist principle itself) 
that a dollar given to one person must be treated for policy purposes as 
creating the same amount of welfare as a dollar given to someone 
else.118 
Recent scholarship has argued, however, that the ordinalist cri-
tique of the material welfare school missed the point of that school by 
substituting a different notion of utility. 119 To be sure, interpersonal 
comparisons of utility are impossible if one must compare the subjec-
tive pleasure that one person receives from receiving, say, a dollar or a 
pair of opera tickets, with the pleasure that someone else might receive 
from the same gifts. However, the material welfare school measured 
utility objectively rather than subjectively. Furthermore, the objective 
criteria that it used were closely tied with such empirically measurable 
factors as productivity, which are the kind of data upon which the 
117. The term "material welfare" school used here comes from Cooter & Rappaport, Were 
the Ordinalists Wrong About Welfare Economics?, 22 J. EcoN. LIT. 507, 512 n.14 (1984). 
118. See Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our Worse-than-
Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law 
and Economics, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 950, 984. Markovits notes that the basis for many econo-
mists' profession of indifference toward wealth transfers is the assumption that utility cannot be 
compared across persons. The conclusions to be drawn from such an assumption vary; however, 
the Chicago School appears to conclude that, since no assumption can be made that a dollar is 
worth more to one person than to another, they are entitled to assume that a dollar is worth the 
same to everyone. Markovits characterizes this assumption as "heroic." Id. at 987. 
A large literature supporting the thesis that mere wealth transfers cannot effect a welfare 
improvement rests on the premise that utility cannot be quantified and compared across individ-
uals. See L. ROBBINS, AN EssAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (2d 
ed. 1935); Hicks & Allen, A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value (pts. 1 & 2), 1 EcoNOMICA 
52, 196 (1934). The literature, as well as the relevant economic issues, are summarized in Cooter 
& Rappaport, supra note 117, at 520-26. 
119. See generally Cooter & Rappaport, supra note 117. 
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public policymaker must rely. 12° For example, the policymaker might 
make the empirical observation that a sum of money given to a poor 
person might enable the poor person to educate herself or buy an auto-
mobile, while the same sum given to a wealthy person would have no 
measurable effect on the wealthy person's behavior.121 
This critique of ordinalist assumptions undermines any notion that 
the policymaker must regard wealth transfers as welfare neutral. The 
policymaker might just as easily assume that a dollar paid in wages to 
a consumer creates more welfare than a dollar paid in dividends to the 
shareholders of a monopoly corporation or in bonuses to its manag-
ers.122 Perhaps more important for antitrust purposes, he might also 
assume that the profits earned by a small family business contribute 
more to total welfare than an equal amount of profits earned by a very 
large firm. If "welfare" is defined objectively in such cases, by mea-
sured changes in behavior that result from a particular allocation of 
resources, the policymaker could quite easily produce empirical data 
that would support the claim. 
In short, the fact that within the ordinalist model "efficiency," or 
welfare, is distinct from wealth distribution, does not require the poli-
cymaker to regard distributional concerns as irrelevant to antitrust 
policy. The market efficiency model in this case rests on an unverified 
assumption that the policymaker may find uncompelling and inappro-
priate. As a result, a value decision must still be made about whether 
wealth transfers are to be ignored in antitrust policymaking. If the 
policymaker decided that monopoly wealth transfers do affect welfare 
and that the antitrust laws are as good a legislative mechanism as any 
to deal with this problem, he would find plenty of economic argument 
- also supported by unprovable premises - to back him up. 
A. Efficiency: Inside and Outside the Model 
Economists use the word "efficiency" in several ways.123 They may 
mean productive efficiency, which is a ratio between the amount of a 
120. Id. at 509. 
121. See generally id. at 515 n.21 (noting that the validity of objective interpersonal compari-
sons is "a theme of current philosophical inquiry"). 
122. Cooter and Rappoport argue very convincingly that the great debate in welfare econom-
ics between the cardinalists, who assumed that interpersonal comparisons of utility are possible, 
and ordinalists, who denied such a possibility, was really semantic. In fact, interpersonal compar-
isons of utility are possible if utility is measured objectively, in terms of what the "average" or 
"typical" person or class of persons desires, or alternatively, in terms of the effect of particular 
wealth transfer on observed behavior. However, such comparisons are impossible if utility is 
measured subjectively, in terms of what individual people actually want. Id. at 526-28. 
123. See, e.g., F. SCHERER, supra note 50, at 13-20 ("allocative" efficiency), 302-03 ("produc-
tive" efficiency), 20-21, 464-66 ("X-inefficiency"). 
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firm's inputs and the amount of its outputs. The firm that can produce 
a widget worth one dollar with inputs costing ninety cents is more 
efficient in this sense than the firm that requires inputs costing one 
dollar to produce the same widget. 
The classical price theory model has many things to say about pro-
ductive efficiency. For example, it says that in a competitive market 
price will be established by the costs of the "marginal" firm, or the 
least efficient firm capable of sustaining production and selling at a 
price equal to or greater than its costs. 124 That firm will make roughly 
zero economic profits, while any firm in the market whose productive 
efficiency is greater will earn some economic profits. The model also 
tells us that practices such as vertical integration or mergers that in-
crease a firm's productive efficiency will permit the firm to cut its price 
and increase its market share, or else make higher profits at the same 
price. Once the practice that creates productive efficiency is copied by 
competitors, the price will be driven down to a new marginal cost 
lower than the marginal cost before the efficiency-creating practice 
came into existence.125 
Even within the Chicago School paradigm, productive efficiency is 
not perceived to be a dominant concern of the antitrust laws, except in 
a negative sense.126 Chicago School antitrust policy encourages pro-
ductive efficiency merely by refusing to make increases in productive 
efficiency a reason for condemning certain practices127 and by approv-
ing practices that are unlikely to increase a firm's market power and 
are likely to increase productive efficiency.128 Under the Chicago 
School theory the market itself, not the antitrust laws, punishes pro-
ductive inefficiency by loss of profits, loss of market share, or in ex-
treme cases, forced exit from the market. 129 If a firm engages in a 
practice that raises its own costs above those of its competitors, that 
should be of no general concern to the antitrust laws, unless the prac-
124. This will generally be true only if the low-cost inputs enjoyed by the more efficient firms 
are incapable of being duplicated. If the low-cost inputs can be duplicated competition will force 
other firms to duplicate the low-cost input as well and the price will decrease. See H. 
HoVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 81. 
125. See generally Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: the Legal History of an 
Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 157 (1954). 
126. For example, even Chicago School scholars are skeptical about the creation of an "effi-
ciency defense" in merger cases, because the judicial task of measurement would be too compli-
cated. See Hovenkamp, Merger Actions far Damages, 35 HAsTINGS L.J. 937, 946-47 (1984), 
127. The Supreme Court violated this rule in some Warren era cases such as Brown Shoe Co. 
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), where it condemned a merger because the postmerger firm 
was able to take advantage of efficiencies that enabled it to undersell smaller rivals. See 370 U.S. 
at 344. 
128. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 91. 
129. See Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 8, at 24. 
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tice also increases the firm's market power or raises the overall price 
level in the market.130 
The Chicago School theory that antitrust policy generally ought to 
permit firms to maximize their own productive efficiency131 is not par-
ticularly controversial today. The more serious difficulty with Chi-
cago School policy concerning efficiency is its insistence that the 
exclusive goals of the antitrust laws should be to maximize net alloca-
tive efficiency, and that the classical price theory model can define the 
circumstances under which this will occur.132 
Allocative efficiency is a much more global kind of efficiency than 
is productive efficiency. Allocative efficiency refers to the welfare of 
society as a whole. Situation A is more allocatively efficient than situa-
tion B if affected people as a group are somehow better off under A 
than they are under B. 
The classic definition of allocative efficiency was provided by Vil-
fredo Pareto in 1909.133 Under the Pareto definition, a situation is 
efficient, or "Pareto optimal," if no change from that situation could 
make someone better off without also making at least one other person 
worse off. Likewise, a given situation A is "Pareto superior" to situa-
tion B if the move from B to A does in fact make at least one person 
better off without making another person worse off. 
The Pareto definition of allocative efficiency imposes such a strict 
requirement on efficiency-based policymaking that its conditions can 
virtually never be fulfilled. Nearly all policy changes fail to be alloca-
tively efficient under the Pareto test. For example, the adoption of a 
rule condemning bank robbery is not a Pareto superior move from a 
situation in which bank robbery is tolerated, because people who profit 
from robbing banks are made worse off by the rule change. Nonethe-
less, most people would probably agree that society as a whole is some-
how better off if bank robbery is forbidden. 134 
Because of this severe practical limitation in the Pareto efficiency 
criterion, efficiency-based policymaking must generally be guided by 
some notion of efficiency other than orthodox Pareto efficiency. The 
most common alternative, generally advocated by the Chicago School, 
is "potential" Pareto efficiency, sometimes called Kaldor-Hicks effi-
130. Productive inefficiency might become an antitrust concern if a firm does something that 
raises its own costs, but that raises rivals' costs even more. See text at notes 289-307 infra. 
131. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 91. 
132. See id.; R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 8-22. 
133. v. PARETO, MANUEL D' EcONOMlE PoLmQUE (1909). 
134. See Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 9. 
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ciency.135 A change is efficient in the potential Pareto sense if the 
gains experienced by those who gain from the change are larger than 
the losses experienced by those who lose due to the change. Such a 
change is said to be "potential" Pareto efficient because it could be 
turned into a pure Pareto efficient move if the gainers would compen-
sate the losers out of their gains. If that occurred, then the losers 
would be no worse off, because they would have been fully compen-
sated. However, the gainers would still be better off, because they 
have something left over after they have paid the compensation. Im-
portantly, the potential Pareto criterion does not require the gainers 
actually to compensate the losers. That would be a distributive con-
cern. The move is "potential" Pareto superior if the gainers could 
compensate the losers fully and still have some gains left over.136 
Unfortunately, the move from orthodox Pareto efficiency to poten-
tial Pareto efficiency as an efficiency norm for policymakers comes 
with a very large cost. The rigor of the orthodox Pareto criterion 
meant that real world changes seldom or never fulfilled its conditions; 
however, it also made a true Pareto improvement - or, more realisti-
cally, a change that was not a true Pareto improvement - relatively 
easy to identify. A change was a Pareto improvement if no one ob-
jected to it. On the other hand, if at least one person objected, then 
the change was presumptively not Pareto superior.137 
The potential Pareto criterion, however, requires the policymaker 
not only to identify all those who gain and lose from a particular 
change, but also to quantify their individual gains and losses, sum 
them, and net them out against each other in order to determine 
whether the net effect is a social gain or a social loss. Even if welfare 
can be measured in constant dollars, 138 it is by no means clear that the 
policymaker is up to this task. 
To be sure, perhaps in extreme cases it may be fairly clear that a 
certain policy change is efficient or inefficient under the potential 
Pareto criterion. For example, the adoption of a rule condemning 
child molesting is probably efficient, while the adoption of a rule con-
demning singing in the shower is probably inefficient. However, in the 
vast middle range of cases - the "controversial" cases where political 
interests line up on both sides of the question - the identification of 
the "efficient" rule under the potential Pareto criterion is unclear. t39 
135. R. POSNER, supra note 95, at 91. 
136. Id. at 91-92. 
137. Id. at 88. 
138. See text at notes 116-22 supra. 
139. For example, see Stigler, The Origin of the Sherman Act, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1985), in 
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The market efficiency model provides considerable conceptual gui-
dance in identifying efficient rule changes, provided that one accepts 
the limitations imposed by the model itself. For example, it can easily 
be shown that the move from competition to monopoly in a particular 
market is inefficient by the potential Pareto criterion. Although the 
amount of lost consumers' surplus is offset in part by a gain in produ-
cers' surplus, over and above this is a "deadweight loss" which entails 
that the net losses caused by monopoly are larger than net gains. 140 
However, the ease with which allocative efficiency can be quanti-
fied within the confines of the market efficiency model belies the many 
complexities of measurement in the real world. 141 For one thing, in a 
market economy every change imposed on one market affects dozens 
of other markets as well. Furthermore, the allocative effects of mo-
nopoly in multiple markets may tend to cancel each other out. In that 
case it is not at all clear that the elimination of monopoly in a single 
market will be Pareto efficient. Although the existence of such 
problems of "second-best" is widely accepted, the degree to which the 
problem frustrates the pursuit of allocative efficiency in the real world 
is quite controversial. 142 
Problems of second-best may be so overwhelming and so hypothet-
ical that the antitrust policymaker is well off to avoid them. 143 Other 
external problems of the market efficiency model are not so easy to 
ignore, however. The model fails to account for preferences that peo-
which a leading Chicago School economist attempted to measure the support and opposition to 
the Sherman Act but was able to produce only very ambiguous conclusions, even though the 
Sherman Act was one of the least controversial statutes ever passed by Congress. See also Mar-
kovits, supra note 23, at 45. 
140. See R. POSNER, supra note 95, at 91-92. Once again, however, the illustration assumes 
that welfare can be measured in constant dollars. 
141. Some of the problems are summarized in Markovits, supra note 23, at 45-49; Markovits, 
Monopolistic Competition, Second Best, and The Antitrust Paradox: A Review Article, 77 MICH. 
L. REV. 567, 570 (1979) (reviewing R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR 
WITH ITSELF (1978)). 
142. The literature on problems of second-best is extensive, and economists differ widely 
about the degree to which second-best problems frustrate any real-world policy of improving 
allocative efficiency. For an argument that second-best problems are substantial and generally 
make it impossible for the policymaker to know that an efficiency gain in one market will yield an 
overall efficiency gain, see Markovits, supra note 118, at 967-77. For arguments that second-best 
problems should be ignored, unless it is quite obvious that increased competition in one market is 
causing greater efficiency losses in a second market, see Baumol, Informed Judgment, Rigorous 
Theory and Public Policy, 32 S. EcoN. J. 137, 144 (1965); Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market 
Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 
987 (1979). However, all these arguments are not "proofs" at all; rather, they should appropri-
ately be regarded as "statements of faith" that an efficiency improvement in one market must, as 
a general rule, make all of society better off. 
143. For a truly pessimistic conclusion, suggesting that second-best problems might be so 
substantial that they would undermine any policy search for allocative efficiency, see F. 
SCHERER, supra note 50, at 28. 
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ple do not express with their dollars - for example, a distrust of large 
concentrations of economic or political power in private hands, or per-
haps even a preference for more expansive opportunities for small 
business.144 As a general rule, these preferences have been considered 
even by supporters to be "noneconomic" - that is, as goals that have 
nothing to do with the public welfare.145 Likewise, Chicago School 
scholars who advocate an exclusively "economic" approach to anti-
trust policy exclude such goals as being "noneconomic" or as some-
how inconsistent with the notion that the antitrust laws ought to 
maximize allocative efficiency.146 
Such reasoning is based on the irrational assumption that people 
do not place a value on these asserted "noneconomic" goals. The rea-
soning is irrational because the fact that people are willing to assert 
such goals, and that political dialogue in the United States is heavily 
loaded with references to them, 147 indicates that people do indeed 
value such things as the diffusion of privately held economic or polit-
ical power or the preservation of small business opportunity. That 
these goals are so prominent in the legislative history of the antitrust 
laws148 as well as in the more general American democratic and egali-
tarian ideology149 illustrates clearly enough that some people value 
them greatly. The concept of allocative efficiency or wealth maximiza-
tion must include everything to which people assign a value. If a re-
gime of small businesses is worth anything to anybody, then it 
deserves to be calculated into the equation offsetting the costs and ben-
efits of a given antitrust policy. In that case, the antitrust policy of 
protecting small business is very much an "economic" goal. 
Why are goals such as the preservation of small business or the 
diffusion of power, which some Americans clearly value, not even enti-
tled to inclusion in the Chicago School cost-benefit calculus? The an-
swer, it appears, is that Americans, no matter how strongly they might 
state those preferences in other contexts, fail to vote them with their 
dollars. People may prefer small business or resent political power in 
the abstract, and they may make or applaud political speeches to the 
same effect, but when the time comes to make purchase decisions, they 
144. Such concerns are summarized in Pitofsky, supra note 12; Schwartz, supra note 12. 
145. See Schwartz, supra note 12. 
146. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 6, at 50-56; R. POSNER, supra note 19, at 19-20. 
147. See Bertholf, Independence and Enterprise.· Small Business in the American Dream, in 
SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE 28-48 (S. Bruchey ed. 1980). See Schwartz, supra note 12, 
for citation of a substantial list of federal statutes concerned with the welfare of small business. 
148. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 50-54; see also text at notes 167-76, infra. 
149. See note 147 supra. 
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invariably look for the best product at the lowest price, even if the 
offeror is a very large and politically powerful corporation. 
The explanation for such consumer behavior should be obvious to 
anyone familiar with the large literature on free riding, most of it writ-
ten by Chicago School scholars.150 Both a regime in which businesses 
have little political and economic power and expansive opportunity for 
small business are public goods - things that many people may want 
but believe they can avoid paying for. 151 Although Chicago School 
economists developed the free riding model to explain why certain ver-
tical restrictions are really efficient, they have neglected to apply the 
free riding model to the manifold situations in which free riding is a 
common occurrence. 
It seems clear from the literature and mystique surrounding the 
small business in America that many people and the legislatures they 
elect place a high value on the so-called "mom and pop" store. Like-
wise, many people appear to be quite uncomfortable about the large 
amount of political and economic power wielded by large firms. 152 
Many members of society value a regime in which businesses do not 
have so much influence. However, such a regime can be paid for only 
if each consumer individually agrees to do business with smaller 
stores, stores with lower productive efficiency (and higher prices) and 
no such power. If each consumer prefers to save the money now, 
trusting others or the government to support the small firm, a substan-
tial free rider problem exists. This is borne out by the fact that con-
sumer statements frequently seem to be inconsistent with consumer 
exercises of preferences in the marketplace. The individual consumer 
buys where prices are low - not because he is not wary of economic 
concentration, but because his own unilateral purchase decision is not 
enough to change the economic structure of society. The Chicago 
School view that consumer preferences should dominate any "effi-
ciency" analysis applies only to markets in which consumers are 
forced to pay for everything they receive. In most real world markets 
this is simply not the case. 
One problem with this argument is that there is no way of stopping 
it. If people really prefer small shops but take a free ride by buying 
from larger stores with lower costs, then the world containing the 
150. Bork, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer We/fare, 77 YALE L.J. 950 (1968); Bork, 
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE 
L.J. 373 (1966); Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86 
(1960). 
151. For an analysis of the economics of public goods, see E. MANSFIELD, 
MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND .APPLlCATIONS 466-90 (4th ed. 1982). 
152. See note 147 supra. 
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small shops can be more "efficient" than the world without them, and 
an antitrust policy that protects them would be "efficient" as well. 
In short, the presumption made by the market efficiency model 
that consumer behavior is the best guide to allocative efficiency works 
only when consumers can be forced to pay for everything they receive. 
It fails to consider values that are not reflected in consumer choices in 
the marketplace. Today we know that externalities are pervasive in 
almost every market transaction. For example, we cannot rely on in-
dividual consumer behavior to control air and water pollution - even 
though the great majority of consumers presumably prefer unpolluted 
air and water. Firms that do not clean their emissions into the air and 
water have lower costs and correspondingly lower prices; however, 
they would quickly go out of business if each consumer unilaterally 
decided to buy instead from a higher-cost firm that was more protec-
tive of the environment.153 Consumers are not likely to do that on 
their own, however, because each one individually knows that her own 
purchase decision will have little impact on the behavior of the firm; 
she shifts the burden elsewhere. If such consumer free riding is wide-
spread in society, then the neoclassical market efficiency model's reli-
ance on consumer behavior 154 as a measure of allocative efficiency is 
too naive to be a useful policymaking tool for the real world. 
B. Is Efficiency the Only Thing That Counts? 
The broadest statement of the Chicago School position on effi-
ciency and public policy is that all policymaking by the State should 
be concerned exclusively with allocative efficiency. Some Chicago 
School scholars adopt this position, or at least one that is very close. 155 
A narrower rule is that antitrust policy should be concerned exclu-
sively with efficiency. 156 Certain parts of the federal government, in-
cluding some federal judges, may follow the narrower version;157 
however, the government is not close to following the broader version. 
The Reagan administration's efforts to destroy the New Deal notwith-
standing, distributive justice is still very much a part of general federal 
policymaking. 
The arguments for both the broad and the narrow versions of the 
153. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 151, at 472-73. 
154. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 91. 
155. See R. POSNER, supra note 95; Posner, The Efficiency Norm, supra note 58. 
156. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 81. 
157. See Gerhart, supra note 24; see also 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 36; Schwartz, 
The New Merger Guidelines: Guide to Governmental Discretion and Private Counseling or Propa-
ganda for Revision of the Antitrust Laws?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 575 (1983). 
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Chicago School position on policymaking appear to rest on four prem-
ises: (1) A society in which allocative efficiency, or welfare, is maxi-
mized is better than one in which it is not; or alternatively, more 
welfare is better than less. (2) Policymakers are capable of creating 
and implementing a policy of maximizing total social wealth without 
regard to the way in which wealth is distributed.158 (3) Policy con-
cerns about wealth distribution, on the other hand, reflect purely polit-
ical conflicts between interest groups and cannot be justified in any 
rigorous, scientific manner. (4) Efficiency goals and distributional 
goals or, alternatively, efficiency effects and distributional effects can 
be segregated from each other. 
Analysis of the soundness of these premises is beyond the scope of 
this paper. 159 Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider briefly the 
fourth premise, that efficiency concerns and distributive concerns can 
be separated from one another. If that premise is false, any notion 
that allocative efficiency can be the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws 
becomes unsupportable. 
No one denies that wealth transfer policies can have a substantial 
effect on efficiency, particularly if people know about the policies in 
advance and plan their affairs around them. High tax rates on the 
wealthy may reduce the incentive to invest or work. On the other side, 
welfare payments may reduce the incentive to work or, alternatively, 
they may provide needed support such as education or child care that 
make the recipient a more productive member of society. 
Likewise, no one doubts that a policy of maximizing wealth, which 
is expressly concerned only with efficiency, nevertheless has important 
effects on the way wealth is distributed.160 An antimonopoly law may 
have the effect of transferring wealth away from the monopolist and 
toward consumers. An "efficiency defense" in merger cases may make 
consumers and larger firms, or firms in a position to merge, better off 
at the expense of other firms.161 
It seems that the vast majority of policies simultaneously affect so-
ciety's total wealth as well as the way that wealth is distributed. As a 
result, the fourth premise above needs to be modified. In the real 
world, efficiency and distributional effects generally cannot be sepa-
rated from one another. It would probably be impossible to imple-
158. See text at notes 137-46 supra. 
159. However, all four are discussed in somewhat different form in Markovits, supra note 
118, at 38; Markovits, supra note 141, at 48. 
160. See Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 4. 
161. See Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Offs, 58 AM. 
EcoN. R.Ev. 18 (1968). 
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ment a policy that increased social wealth without affecting the way 
wealth is distributed. Alternatively, although perhaps less clearly, it 
may be impossible to transfer wealth without affecting total social 
wealth.162 The correct premise must be that efficiency goals and dis-
tributive goals can be separated from one another, and that this fact, 
combined with the other three premises, justifies an antitrust policy of 
exclusive concern with efficiency. 
If efficiency goals and distributive goals can really be separated, 
then it would appear that the duty of the Chicago School antitrust 
policymaker is to look only at the efficiency effects of a policy and 
ignore any distributional effects. Unpopular distributional effects can 
be corrected later by a different policy. For example, if a rigorous 
antitrust policy concerned exclusively with efficiency ends up transfer-
ring too much wealth away from small businesses, Congress can com-
pensate by giving them low interest loans or other transfer 
payments.163 
Unfortunately, the low interest loans will undermine the antitrust 
policy of encouraging efficiency. To use an efficiency-based antitrust 
policy that permits firms to become very large and injures those that 
remain inefficiently small, but then to "compensate" the small busi-
nesses by low cost loans or other transfer payments, diminishes the 
efficiency advantage of being big. For example, suppose that a small 
firm produces widgets at a cost of ten cents each, while a large firm 
produces them at nine cents each. An antitrust policy of promoting 
efficiency would at least passively encourage firms to become large, 
perhaps by permitting mergers or internal growth that achieved pro-
duction economies or by refusing to condemn the lower prices of 
larger firms as "predatory." However, if the smaller firms became the 
beneficiaries of low interest loans or tax incentives unavailable to the 
larger firms, the incentive to become large would be diminished and 
the antitrust policy frustrated. 
It appears that an antitrust policy of maximizing efficiency cannot 
162. There might be some exceptions here. For example, if the government conducted n 
secret lottery and suddenly announced that everyone whose birthday is May 29 must pay $100 to 
someone whose birthday is August 27, the result might be a wealth transfer with no efficiency 
effects. In this case, however, the idiosyncratic nature of the exception probably proves the rule. 
Most real world wealth transfers invite people to alter their behavior, either so as to receive the 
benefit of the transfer or to avoid having to pay it. For an argument that the purpose of the just 
compensation clause of the fifth amendment is to force the state to pass efficient legislation that 
leaves the distribution of wealth untouched, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY 
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985), especially at 3-6. 
163. In fact, Congress has done that. For example, see the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 631-47 (1982); Small Business Emergency Relief Act, 41 U.S.C. § 252 (1982); Small Business 
Investment Act, 15 U.S.C. § 661-96 (1982). 
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be pursued with anything resembling consistency unless the govern-
ment is willing to adopt a much more general policy of maximizing 
efficiency - or, to put the matter bluntly, unless the government 
abandons its concern with how wealth is distributed, at least with re-
spect to business finns. 164 However, any argument in favor of a more 
general policy of maximizing efficiency while ignoring distributive 
concerns must meet one objection that no one has answered. The "ef-
ficient" allocation of resources in any particular society is substantially 
a function of the way that society's wealth is distributed initially.16s 
For example, if members of a society of one hundred people are all 
given equal amounts of wealth and then commence a process of ex-
change that will yield an efficient outcome, the outcome will be differ-
ent than it would be if one person in that society had been given ninety 
percent of the wealth, while the other ninety-nine divided the remain-
ing ten percent. This is so because the amount of wealth that someone 
has affects his or her wealth priorities. The wealthy may place high 
values on expensive jewelry or exotic vacations, for example. On the 
other hand, the working poor may place a very high value on bologna 
and actually bid it away from the wealthy, who show little interest. 
The principle that the "efficient" outcome depends on the initial 
distribution of wealth is not particularly controversial. However, the 
principle plays havoc with any notion that a public policy can be con-
cerned exclusively with efficiency in all areas of life. The problem 
might not be great if society could plausibly have an antitrust policy 
concerned exclusively with efficiency, and then freely use other poli-
cies based on notions of fairness to redistribute wealth in ways that 
society finds appropriate. However, as we saw above, such an anti-
trust policy based exclusively on efficiency will not work unless other 
policies are based on efficiency as well. 
The principle that the efficient outcome is a function of the initial 
distribution of wealth deprives the efficiency goal of a great deal of its 
intellectual appeal. Its proponents talk about the "initial distribution" 
of wealth and the "efficient outcome" as if both existed at some finite 
moment in time - as if there were a single starting distribution of 
wealth and a single concluding efficient outcome. In fact, in a dy-
namic world the problem is far more complex. The distribution of 
164. A program of redistributing wealth might have no effect on an efficiency-only antitrust 
policy if the redistribution were completely random as to business firms. However, many govern-
ment economic policies do favor smaller firms. See the statutes cited in note 163 supra. Further-
more, it would be impossible to devise a redistribution policy whose effects did not favor any 
particular class of business firm. 
165. See Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 
6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 331 (1977). 
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wealth in society shifts daily, and the market itself never arrives at an 
efficient "outcome." It only approaches such an outcome through a 
never ending series of exchanges. 
Monopoly distributes wealth to the monopolist and away from 
consumers. To the extent that the world contains monopolists, the 
efficient "outcome" at any particular time is a function of a starting 
distribution of wealth that already reflects the existence of monopoly. 
What, then, does it mean to say that the market is "efficient," or gen-
erates efficient solutions? It means simply that people's preferences 
are a function of the position in which they find themselves. People 
with wealth, including wealth caused by monopoly, express different 
preferences than people who are poor. As far as allocative efficiency is 
concerned, however, one initial distribution is as good as another. 
To date, no compelling argument has been made for a policy of 
maximizing satisfaction from a given starting point that says nothing 
about the location of the starting point. Until such an argument is 
made, the notion of "allocative efficiency" is, at best, a trivial guide to 
policymaking.166 
On the other hand, it seems clear that the market is a very power-
ful device by which people maximize their satisfactions given the ex-
isting distribution of wealth. Furthermore, absent legal restraints on 
alienation, the market functions whether or not the State is involved in 
the involuntary redistribution of wealth. People are very good at "in-
venting around" constraints imposed by the State, and they will use 
the market to pursue wealth maximizing, or "efficient" outcomes, no 
matter what the "starting" distribution of wealth is. As a result, from 
the point of view of allocative efficiency, one starting distribution is as 
good as another. From the viewpoint of justice, however, one starting 
distribution may be much more desirable than another. For this rea-
son the State may as well pursue a just distribution of wealth as permit 
166. That the efficient outcome is a function of the initial distribution of wealth weakens the 
argument for efficiency even more under the Chicago School concept of "wealth maximization" 
than under the more traditional utilitarian notion that welfare is reflected by people's prefer-
ences. Wealth maximization measures welfare only by what people actually buy, not by what 
they would like to have. As a result, the purchase "vote" of the wealthy person who does not 
care to have, say, a new house and that of a poor person who would like to have one very much 
but cannot afford one receive the same weight in the wealth maximization welfare calculation: 
zero. See Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 
451, 478-79 (1974); see also Tribe, Constitutional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency?, 
98 HARV. L. REv. 592, 595 (1985). On one hand, the theory of wealth maximization, which 
weights actual purchases rather than preferences, solves the empirical problem that no poli-
cymaker could ever measure stated preferences but can measure actual purchases. On the other 
hand, the result is that wealth maximization appears not to measure "welfare" at all, unless the 
ability to purchase is an essential ingredient in welfare. It seems clear, for example, that gifts of a 
new house to the wealthy person and the poor person described above would not produce identi-
cal amounts of satisfaction. 
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an unjust one. The market can always be trusted to maximize people's 
welfare, given any particular starting point. 
C. The Problem of Legislative History 
A democratic sovereign must pay more than lip service to the 
proposition that the voters are entitled to have what they want, even if 
they want something irrational or inconsistent with the dominant 
model for policy. This creates a problem for the economic poli-
cymaker different from any encountered by the academic economist or 
other scientist. The people who collect empirical data and "apply" a 
particular natural science model in, say, physics, have a certain sensi-
tivity to the scientific model and its limitations. However, the partici-
pants in the democratic process usually exhibit no such sensitivity. 
This is certainly true of voters, special interest groups, and lobbyists, 
but it may also describe elected members of the legislative, executive, 
and even the judicial branches. To be sure, the economist employed 
by the Department of Justice "makes" economic policy, and may be 
very sensitive to the demands of a particular economic theory. But the 
Justice Department economist is hired and directed by an appointed 
antitrust chief, who answers to an appointed Attorney General who in 
turn responds to the policies of an elected president. As a result the 
Justice Department economist is likely to be pulled as hard by political 
necessity as by scientific integrity. Which of these should prevail in a 
democratic country? More appropriately, to what degree can an ap-
pointed policymaker take advantage of "market failures" in the legis-
lative process167 to create enforcement policy that is inconsistent with 
the legislative history of the statute being enforced? 
The legislative histories of the various antitrust laws fail to exhibit 
anything resembling a dominant concern for economic efficiency. 
Dozens of scholars have scrutinized these legislative histories in order 
to determine what Congress had in mind. 168 Their efforts will not be 
167. Le., instances when the legislative process fails to provide the efficient solution to the 
problem. 
168. On the Sherman Act, see Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J. 
L. & EcoN. 7 (1966) (arguing that the legislative history of the Sherman Act reveals a dominant 
concern for efficiency); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Anti-
trust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HAsTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (arguing that the 
framers of the Sherman Act were concerned about protecting consumers from unfair distribu-
tions of wealth away from them and toward monopolists). On the Clayton Act, see Bok, Section 
7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economies, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 233-38 
(1960) (arguing that Congress was excessively concerned with protecting small business, particu-
larly in the 1950 amendments). On the Robinson-Patman Act, see Hansen, Robinson-Patman 
Law: A Review and Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REv. 1113 (1983) (concluding that Congress was 
concerned chiefly with protecting small businesses from the buying practices oflarger firms). See 
also H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 50-54. 
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repeated here. No one, it appears, has even attempted to argue that 
Congress had "efficiency" in mind when it passed the Robinson-Pat-
man Act in 1936, or the Celler-Kefauver amendments to Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act in 1950. Those statutes were designed to protect a 
particular constituency, small business, that had managed to make its 
case to Congress.169 Likewise, no compelling case has been made that 
efficiency considerations dominated in the passage of the Clayton Act 
itself.170 The strongest argument that Congress was motivated by con-
cerns of efficiency when it passed an antitrust law has been made by 
Professor (now Judge) Bork, and is concerned largely with the Sher-
man Act. 171 However, Bork's work has been called into question by 
subsequent scholarship showing that in 1980 Congress had no real con-
cept of efficiency and was really concerned with protecting consumers 
from unfavorable wealth transfers. 172 
Of course, Congress could rewrite the antitrust laws and make 
concerns for efficiency express, but it has not done so. In fact, the 
widely proclaimed Chicago School "revolution" has pretty much 
passed Congress by. Historically, liberals173 have been fairly success-
ful in getting Congress to write liability-expanding antitrust stat-
utes.174 However, with only a few trivial exceptions, free marketers 
have had no such luck.175 Leaders in conservative administrations 
have asked for legislation weakening the merger laws or abolishing 
169. See Hansen, supra note 168. 
170. On the legislative history of the original Clayton Act, see W. LETWJN, supra note 39, at 
273-76; D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE Cl.AITON ACT 20-43 (1959). 
171. See Bork, supra note 168. 
172. See Lande, supra note 168. 
173. That is, welfare liberals, not classical liberals. 
174. For example, the Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C. (1982)), passed in 1914 during the Wilson adminis-
tration; the Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526-28 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-
13b, 21a (1982)), passed during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration; the Celler-Kefauver 
amendments to § 7 (relating to mergers) of the Clayton Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1982)), passed during the Truman administration. 
Perhaps the one notable exception is the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-
145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45a (1968)), which abolished "fair trade" and argua-
bly restored the per se rule for resale price maintenance. That statute was passed during the 
Nixon administration. However, given the controversial nature of resale price maintenance, it is 
difficult to characterize the statute as either liberal or conservative. 
175. The liability-restricting statutes that have been passed are generally either jurisdictional, 
or else nibble away at economic areas that cover a relatively small percentage of antitrust activ-
ity. Examples are the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 35, 36 (Supp. II 
1984), which abolished treble damages for antitrust violations by municipalities; the Export 
Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982), which gives a limited antitrust 
exemption to qualified export trade associations and companies; and the National Cooperative 
Research Act of 1984, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-05 (Supp. II 1984), which gives an exemption from the 
per se rule to qualified research joint ventures. All three of these statutes were passed during the 
Reagan administration. 
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treble damages, but Congress has generally resisted these requests. 176 
To be sure, there may be a very good explanation for this: no one 
lobbies Congress for allocative efficiency. A statute is "efficient" if it 
produces more gains than losses, regardless of where the gains and 
losses appear. However, the interest groups that reach Congress are 
concerned not with maximizing the amount of wealth that is pro-
duced, but rather with making sure that a particular group gets its fair 
share. To be sure, the farmers' lobbyist may argue that price supports 
will make America as a whole wealthier - but what he really wants is 
to make farmers wealthier.177 
Of course, this fact does not distinguish the antitrust laws from any 
other kind of legislation. Whether any legislation is "efficient" and 
enlarges social wealth, or merely reflects the desires of one or more 
interest groups, depends on the ability of Congress to listen to the ar-
guments from all sides, "net them out," and then pass a statute that, 
on balance, does more good than harm to all affected interests. The 
more successful Congress is at this, the more frequently its statutes 
will be efficient. On the other hand, the more successful a particular 
interest group is in making its case to Congress, the more frequently 
that group will obtain legislation that shifts wealth in its direction, 
whether or not such legislation is efficient.178 
Initially, Chicago School antitrust scholars expressed sensitivity to 
the relationship between economic policymaking and the democratic 
legislative process. At least they once felt obliged to demonstrate con-
gressional approval of the view that efficiency should be the exclusive 
goal of antitrust enforcement. For example, Robert Bork attempted at 
various times to find a mandate for Chicago School antitrust policy in 
the legislative history of the federal antitrust laws.179 Bork's argument 
may have strained credulity,180 but that is not the point. The point is 
176. For example, see Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge's proposal to repeal § 7 of 
the Clayton Act, 48 ANTrrRusr & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 385 (Feb. 28, 1985); and see the 
Reagan administration proposal to abolish treble damages for rule of reason violations, Draft 
Reagan Administration Legislation on Antitrust, Patents, and Joint Research and Development 
Ventures, 44 ANTrrRusr & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1121, at 1272 (June 30, 1983). The 
latter proposal is discussed in H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 405 n.4. See also the compre-
hensive administration package of antitrust proposals, intended to reduce damages, narrow the 
coverage of § 7 of the Clayton Act, and reduce the extraterritorial jurisdiction of the antitrust 
laws. Administration's Antitrust Law Package, [Current] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) No. 744, pt. 
2 (Feb. 24, 1986). 
177. Professor Easterbrook uses the term "rent-seeking" statutes. Easterbrook, Forward: 
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4, 15-17 (1984). 
178. See Posner, The Reading of Statutes, supra note 58, at 264-72; see generally Stigler, The 
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Ser. 3 (1971); Peltzman, Toward a 
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & EcoN. 211 (1976). 
179. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 50-71; Bork, supra note 168. 
180. See Hovenkamp, supra note 18, at 7-24; see generally Lande, supra note 168. 
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that Bork deemed it important to show that Congress had maximiza-
tion of consumer welfare in mind. From that premise Bork developed 
the argument that this congressionally mandated consumer welfare 
principle necessitated the adoption of the market efficiency model for 
antitrust. 
More recently, however, some Chicago School scholars have ap-
parently abandoned as hopeless the attempt to find support for their 
position in the legislative history of the antitrust laws. Instead, they 
have adopted a different approach - developing arguments for the 
proposition that statutes should be interpreted relatively broadly or 
relatively narrowly depending on their nature. Efficient, or "public 
interest," legislation should be interpreted broadly, and courts should 
not hesitate to interpolate Congress' meaning when the language of 
such statutes contains ambiguities or gaps. On the other hand, rent-
seeking, or "interest group," legislation should be interpreted nar-
rowly, and no remedy should be provided unless Congress was very 
explicit about creating it.181 
Within this paradigm the Sherman Act appears to qualify as public 
interest legislation.182 The Sherman Act condemns "contracts in re-
straint of trade" and "monopolies." As a general rule, condemnation 
of both of those things is efficient, provided that they are properly de-
181. See Baxter, supra note 1, at 661 (written when Professor Baxter was head of the Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice). At various places in his discussion Baxter con-
cludes: (1) Because the Robinson-Patman Act "recognizes as unlawful conduct that injures 
competitors, regardless of its effects on competition," the statute "is not regarded as a true 'anti-
trust' law." This justifies the Justice Department decision not to enforce that Act. Id. at 662 n.6. 
(2) The antitrust laws are really "enabling legislation that has permitted a common-law refine-
ment of antitrust law through an evolution guided by only the most general statutory discre-
tions." Id. at 663. (3) Although the framers of the Sherman Act probably intended to federalize 
the common law of trade restraints, they probably misunderstood that law as protecting competi-
tion rather than competitors; as a result, courts need not look to this common law in making 
federal antitrust policy. Id. at 664 n.12. 
As for the first point above, Mr. Baxter's conclusion is inconsistent, not merely with the 
legislative history of the antitrust laws, but with its clearly expressed language. Section 1 of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982), defines the phrase "antitrust laws" to include the Clayton 
Act itself, § 2 of which is the Robinson-Patman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1982). Congress has 
amended the Clayton Act at least a half dozen times; however, it has never changed the definition 
of "antitrust laws" in such a way as to exclude § 2 of the Clayton Act. 
The Chicago School literature on statutory interpretation is growing rapidly. In general, that 
literature argues that "public interest" statutes - i.e., statutes that are "efficient," or that create 
more social gains than losses - should be interpreted relatively broadly and courts should be 
willing to fill in statutory "gaps" by inferring the legislature's intent. See Posner, The Reading of 
Statutes, supra note 58, at 269. On the other hand, private interest statutes, in which an interest 
group "buys" favorable legislation from Congress, should be strictly interpreted, as a contract 
would be. See Easterbrook, supra note 177, at 15. For a view of executive policymaking and 
inefficient legislation that is much more sensitive to the democratic process, see Sunstein, Cos/-
Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1267 (1981). 
182. Easterbrook, supra note 177, at 15. But see Stigler, supra note 139, at 7 (finding "mod-
est support" for the conclusion that support for the Sherman Act came from small business). 
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fined. Although various interest groups (such as farmers, who 
purchased from monopolists and cartels) may have supported the leg-
islation, 183 the legislation itself was in the public interest - or, more 
precisely, was designed to produce total gains larger than total costs. 
On the other hand, an antitrust law such as the Robinson-Patman 
Act184 would probably have to be considered special interest legisla-
tion.185 The Robinson-Patman Act does not articulate any goal of 
economic efficiency. On the contrary, it was designed to protect small, 
inefficient retail grocers from large chain stores, which had lower costs 
and would drive the small grocers out of business in a competitive 
market. In this instance the small grocers had managed successfully 
to make their case before Congress, which forced the rest of American 
society to pay the bill.186 The same thing can be said for the 1950 
Celler-Kefauver amendments to the antimerger statute,187 which were 
designed primarily to protect small business from horizontal and verti-
cal mergers that produced more efficient rivals.188 
Even within the Chicago School there appears to be disagreement 
about the ease with which courts can distinguish between public inter-
est, or efficient, legislation and interest group, or special interest, legis-
lation.189 Perhaps more important, this distinction between types of 
statutes inserts into political theory a definition of efficiency that can 
be applied only ambiguously, if at all, to real world policy problems. 
To permit judges to weigh statutes on the basis of presumed efficiency 
and to give the interpretive edge to parties invoking efficient statutes is 
little more than to attempt to force a particular concept of efficiency 
into the democratic process. The argument means, quite simply, that 
"efficient" statutes are to be given more weight than "inefficient" ones. 
In the case of the latter, enforcement should be no broader than is 
clearly mandated by the language of the statute. 
The argument can too easily be used to deny remedies that Con-
gress anticipated but did not write into the statutory language. For 
example, Congress clearly had the protection of small business from 
183. See Stigler, supra note 139, at 7. 
184. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 2la (1982). 
185. See Baxter, supra note l, at 662 n.6 (asserting that the Robinson-Patman Act is not "a 
true 'antitrust' act"). 
186. See generally Hansen, supra note 168. 
187. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 18, 21 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)). 
188. See generally Bok, supra note 168. 
189. Compare Easterbrook, supra note 177, at 16-17 (suggesting that it is difficult or impossi-
ble to draw the line between public interest and special interest statutes); with Posner, The Read-
ing of Statutes, supra note 58, at 270-71 (creating a four-type classification scheme for statutes). 
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larger competitors in mind when it passed both the Robinson-Patman 
Act19o and the Celler-Kefauver amendments19 1 to the antimerger stat-
ute. However, that intent is not readily apparent in the language of 
either statute. For example, all of the dirty work done by the Celler-
Kefauver amendments and castigated by the Chicago School was ac-
complished by the statute's legislative history, not by its language.192 
That language, which condemns mergers the effect of which "may be 
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly," 
is pernicious by Chicago School measurement not because of what it 
says, but because of what it means. 193 "Competition" within the mean-
ing of the statute does not refer to a state of affairs in which prices are 
driven to marginal cost and firms are encouraged to pursue all econo-
mies in production and distribution. Rather it refers to a regime in 
which small businesses have a chance to compete against larger, more 
efficient rivals. There is no question that Congress had precisely that 
in mind; however, one will reach this conclusion only by examining 
the Congressional Record and the reports, not by reading the statutory 
language.194 
The Chicago School's classification scheme for statutes is trouble-
some not only for what it does to statutory interpretation, but also for 
its self-serving compromise of the Chicago School model itself. The 
argument shows the nation's leading advocates of the free market deal-
ing with troublesome legislation by suggesting numerous "market fail-
ures" of truly gargantuan proportions. Nearly all the world's other 
markets, including the common law, 195 work quite well within the 
190. See Hansen, supra note 168. Chicago School scholars acknowledge as much. See R. 
Boru::, supra note 6, at 382-84; R. POSNER, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr: FEDERAL REGULA-
TION OF PRICE DIFFERENCES 25-26 (1976). 
191. See generally Bok, supra note 168. At least one Chicago School scholar agrees. See R. 
POSNER, supra note 19, at 99-100. 
192. See the Supreme Court's analysis of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver 
amendments in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962). 
193. This language is criticized by at least one member of the Chicago School for the "incipi-
ency" test which it creates. That is, it is designed to nip anticompetitive mergers in the bud by 
condemning mergers whose effect "may be" to lessen competition or which may "tend to" create 
a monopoly. See R. Boru::, supra note 6, at 47-49. However, it seems that the real problem is not 
the "incipiency" test itself, but rather the definition of "competition" implicit in both the Celler-
Kefauver amendments and the Supreme Court cases such as Brown Shoe, which interpreted 
them. 
194. The legislative history is quite clear. See notes 191-92 supra. 
195. On the common law as an efficient market, see Priest, The Common Law Process a11d the 
Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Rubin, Why is the Common Law Effi-
cient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1982) (suggesting that both common law and legislation have 
become increasingly efficient in recent years). For good critiques of the notion that the common 
law is efficient, written from somewhat different perspectives, see Epstein, The Social Conse-
quences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1717 (1982); Friedman, Tho Faces of Law, 
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Chicago School paradigm.196 As a result, the State's reliance on the 
market should be very broad and the need for price regulation, artifi-
cial restrictions on entry, or other forms of state intervention are mini-
mal. However, for some reason one market that seems not to work is 
the political market. The Chicago School literature on legislation is 
full of detailed explanations of why the legislative process consistently 
fails to produce "efficient" statutes.197 
If a statute is truly efficient - that is, if the gains enjoyed by the 
interest groups that profit from the statute truly outweigh the losses 
suffered by those who lose - then any good Chicagoan should expect 
the political process to generate passage of the statute. The lobbying 
and other political resources contributed by the potential gainers 
should exceed those contributed by the potential losers, because the 
former should be willing to pay more to purchase passage of the stat-
ute than the latter are willing to pay to purchase its nonpassage. 
On the other hand, the Chicagoan ought to expect "special inter-
est" legislation not to be passed at all. In order for special interest 
legislation to be enacted, the special interest group that supports the 
statute must succeed in having its will with Congress even though it 
stands to gain less from the passage of the statute than the losers stand 
to lose. To be sure, it seems clear to this author that this happens, and 
that it happens often. That is not the point here. Rather, the point is 
that the Chicago School's distinction between special interest and effi-
cient legislation is manifestly inconsistent with the general Chicago 
theory that when a market speaks - even a political market - the 
presumption is very strong that it should be listened to. 198 
V. CHICAGO SCHOOL ANTITRUST POLICY: CRITICISMS FROM 
INSIDE THE MODEL 
Criticisms from "inside" the model assume that the model ad-
1984 WIS. L. REv. 13; Kennedy & Michelman, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA 
L. R.Ev. 711 (1980). 
196. Within the Chicago School model even "natural monopoly" public utilities might be 
better left to competitive bidding rather than price regulation. See Demsetz, Why Regulate Utili-
ties?, 11 J. L. & EcoN. 55 (1968). The theory is criticized in Shepherd, "Contestability" vs. 
Competition, 74 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 572 (1984). 
197. For an atypical- in fact, almost out of character- explanation of why the legislative 
"market" does not work, see Posner, The Reading of Statutes, supra note 58. See generally 
Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups far Political Influence, 98 Q. J. EcoN. 
371 (1983). 
198. In fact, the political market has many characteristics that suggest it should work quite 
well - rather low entry barriers (anyone who wants has a constitutionally protected right to 
petition the government), a large number of competing participants, and easy access to market 
information. 
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dresses all relevant values that the policymaker must consider. Fur-
thermore, such criticisms generally do not fault the Chicago School 
premise that allocative efficiency should be the exclusive goal of anti-
trust enforcement.199 The general nature of such critiques is that, even 
though efficiency should be the exclusive goal of antitrust enforce-
ment, the neoclassical market efficiency model is not sophisticated 
enough to describe or predict the consequences of real world behavior. 
This discussion is too brief to consider all critiques from inside the 
model.200 Rather, it focuses on two prominent weaknesses in the neo-
classical market efficiency model that render the model too naive to be 
the exclusive tool of antitrust policymakers: (1) an excessive reliance 
on static concepts of the market in empirical situations where only 
dynamic concepts will explain behavior or results; and (2) a failure to 
appreciate fully the extent and welfare consequences of strategic be-
havior. The second weakness. is in large part. a consequence of the first. 
A. The Static Market Fallacy 
The neoclassical price theory model is static.201 This means that it 
measures the effects of certain practices on price or output given a 
premise that the market being examined is unaffected by external 
events. Unfortunately, antitrust policy must deal with real world mar-
kets, and real world markets are always affected by a complex array of 
external influences. Application of a static model to a real world mar-
ket often causes a court to ignore the obvious. To be sure, the assump-
tion of a static market is a highly useful explanation device. The 
premise that the economic analyst can "freeze" a market often yields a 
clearer understanding of how a particular practice or phenomenon, 
ceteris paribus, will affect price, output, or competition.202 
To illustrate, the neoclassical market efficiency model shows quite 
clearly that the monopolist will reduce output below the competitive 
199. Criticism internal to the Chicago School model may disagree with the premise that 
allocative efficiency should be the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws if they conclude that no 
model for economic efficiency is capable of assessing the efficiency consequences of real world 
behavior. In that case, admission of factors other than efficiency may be essential to 
policymaking. 
200. In fact, a great deal of both welfare economics and price theory - particularly the 
theories first developed in the 1930s - was devoted to criticizing the market efficiency model as 
developed by such neoclassical economists as Alfred Marshall. See text at notes 81-86 supra. 
201. See Posner, supra note 6, at 939-40; Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 23, 
at 299-300; see also Kaplow, supra note 23, at 529-30 (criticizing Professor, now Judge, Easter-
brook for relying too heavily on a static model). 
202. The point is that ceteris paribus is an imaginary island that no real explorer will ever 
find. 
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level.203 The Standard Oil of New Jersey trust became a monopolist in 
the 1860s and 1870s.204 No one has ever contended, however, that 
petroleum output was less in 1900, when Standard was a monopolist, 
than in 1860, when the market was structured more competitively. 
When we say that a monopolist "reduces output" we ordinarily do not 
examine a real world market before and after monopolization oc-
curred and conclude that output was greater before than after. 
Rather, we compare the output that occurs under the existing monop-
oly with the hypothetical output that would occur in a market that was 
identical in all respects but for the existence of the monopoly. Impor-
tantly, that alternative market does not exist, never did exist, and 
never will exist. Only in the most extreme situations, such as where a 
dominant firm buys the plant of its only rival and shuts it down, can 
we engage with some confidence in before-and-after comparisons of 
empirical situations and conclude that monopoly reduces output. 
Many monopolists acquire their initial dominant position as a result of 
patents. As a result, total pre-monopoly output may have been far 
lower than output during the monopoly period.2os 
Consider, for example, the case of Kartell v. Blue Shield, 206 re-
cently decided by the First Circuit. Judge Breyer, who authored the 
opinion, is not only a good federal judge, but also a good economist.207 
The opinion exonerated Blue Shield from charges that its ban on "bal-
ance billing" violated the Sherman Act. Blue Shield, a large health 
insurer with a market share approaching monopoly levels, had created 
a system under which participating doctors agreed to accept Blue 
Shield's published reimbursement rates as their total payment for a 
specified medical procedure.208 The result was that a patient who 
went to a participating physician (from a list provided by Blue Shield) 
knew that his or her insurance policy would provide full coverage. 
In addressing the question whether the Blue Shield plan amounted 
to illegal monopolization, Judge Breyer concluded - quite correctly, 
203. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 101; H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 14-24; Harberger, 
Monopoly and Resource Allocation, AM. EcoN. REv., May 1954, at 77. 
204. See B. BRINGHURST, ANTITRUST AND THE OIL MONOPOLY: THE STANDARD OIL 
CASES, 1890-1911, at 10-16 (1979). 
205. Examples of monopolies that almost certainly produced far more than was produced 
before the monopoly came into existence are the monopolies at issue in United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (aluminum); United States v. E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (cellophane); and E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 
F.T.C. 653 (1980) (titanium dioxide). 
206. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2040 (1985). 
207. See s. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982). 
208. 749 F.2d at 923. For example, if Blue Shield paid $100 for a covered procedure, a 
doctor participating in the Plan could not charge $120 and force the patient to pay the difference. 
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it seems - that Blue Shield was a purchaser of physicians' services on 
behalf of its insureds. 209 This raised the possibility that Blue Shield's 
ban on balance billing might be an exercise of monopsony power. 
That is, Blue Shield may have been using its buying power in the mar-
ket for health care services to force the price below the price that 
would prevail in an unrestrained, competitive market. The result of 
such an exercise of monopsony power would be that the supply of 
physicians' services would be reduced below the competitive equilib-
rium level. Judge Breyer suggested that the plaintiff's argument of 
monopsony was not well founded, citing with apparent approval the 
district court's finding that the supply of doctors in the market area 
had "increased steadily" during the period covered by the litigation.210 
It can easily be shown geometrically or algebraically that when a 
monopsony buyer reduces its outlay to the profit-maximizing level, the 
result will be reduced output of the monopsonized product.211 This 
only means, however, that the absolute supply of the monopsonized 
product will decrease if all other elements of the market remain unaf-
fected during the period in which the market becomes monopsonized. 
As a result, the backwards reasoning - from the premise that supply 
did not decrease to the conclusion that the market was not monop-
sonized - works only if we can assume that a market was completely 
static during the relevant time period, but for the alleged violation.212 
Not only is that assumption of a perfectly static market unwar-
ranted, but it is impossible for a court to identify and measure the 
degree to which the market changed - that is, the degree to which all 
factors external to the market caused the supply of doctors to increase 
or decrease.213 For example, during the relevant time period, Blue 
Shield's monopsony may have tended to reduce the supply of doctors 
or of medical services offered. However, hundreds of other factors 
209. Kartel/, 149 F.2d at 925-26. 
210. 749 F.2d at 927. 
211. For a geometric illustration, see G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 205 (3d ed. 1966); 
for an algebraic illustration, see J. HENDERSON & R. QUANDT, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: A 
MATHEMATICAL APPROACH 190-91 (1980). 
212. Le., the premise works if we can either assume that the market was static, or we can 
identify and quantify all other changes in the market. 
213. Professor Easterbrook is quite sanguine about a court's ability to identify and quantify 
all such changes. He suggests in a recent article that courts should assess the competitive effect 
on output. As to the practicability of such an approach, he concludes that "[t]here are statistical 
tools for doing this, if the data are available." Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 163-64. In fact, 
sufficient data are never available, and if they were, no agency would be large enough or powerful 
enough to deal with them. For a discussion of some of the random determinants of output, and 
the problems of predicting firm size or market share, see F. SCHERER, supra note 50, at 145-50. 
For some interesting observations concerning the current inability of econometricians to make 
accurate predictions concerning market or firm growth, see Blatt, How Economists Misuse Math-
ematics, in WHY EcONOMICS IS NOT YET A SCIENCE (A. Eichner ed. 1983). 
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might have encouraged the supply of doctors to increase during the 
same period. These might have included: (1) higher income by medi-
cal patients in the relevant market area; (2) a high rate of medical 
school graduation, perhaps caused by increasing funding for such edu-
cation; (3) a high rate of illness in the relevant market area; ( 4) in-
creased federal or state subsidies for health care; (5) a reduction in 
state taxes in the relevant market area, which induced professionals to 
move into that area; (6) a population increase; or (7) a change in immi-
gration policy which admitted more foreign doctors into the area. The 
list is merely illustrative, but the point should be clear: to conclude 
that Blue Shield was not monopsonizing the market because the 
amount of the monopsonized product increased rather than decreased 
is not a legitimate use of the theoretical observation - which is quite 
true as far as it goes - that the exercise of monopsony power reduces 
market supply.214 
The same thing can be said of vertical restrictions, such as those 
analyzed by the Supreme Court in Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania, Inc. 215 The Court noted that after Sylvania imposed territorial 
restrictions its overall market share increased from roughly two per-
cent to roughly five percent.216 It has been suggested by members of 
the Chicago School that the fact that a firm's market share or output 
increased after it began to employ vertical restrictions is strong evi-
dence that a practice is competitive rather than anticompetitive.217 In 
most cases, however, such evidence is irrelevant, for the court is inca-
pable of assessing its meaning. 
214. Actually, even the "output" question that Judge Breyer addressed in Kartell was the 
wrong one. He cited evidence that the total supply of physicians in Massachusetts had increased 
during the alleged monopolization period. Kartell, 749 F.2d at 927. A more appropriate ques-
tion, however - and one that is at least theoretically easier to measure empirically - is not 
whether the absolute number of doctors in the entire market decreased as a result of monop-
sonization, but rather whether Blue Shield's market share decreased. When Blue Shield exer-
cised monopsony power, total supply in the market would, ceteris paribus, decline. More 
importantly, Blue Shield's market share within that market would decline to the extent that the 
doctors looked for more profitable alternatives than dealing with Blue Shield under its medical 
cost reduction plan. Evidence that a firm's market share within a market changed is somewhat 
more convincing than evidence about output in the market as a whole, because the first kind of 
evidence segregates out all exogenous factors that affected the market as a whole. Nevertheless, 
even change in market share is extremely difficult to measure empirically, for the fortunes of 
individual firms in markets can vary enormously. See F. SCHERER, supra note 50, at 145-50. 
215. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
216. 433 U.S. at 38. 
217. See Easterbrook, supra note 1, at 163-64 (footnote omitted). Professor Easterbrook sug-
gests that a court analyzing vertical restrictions hold other factors such as demand constant. 
Then, if "the manufacturer's sales rise, the practice confers benefits exceeding its costs. If they 
fall, that suggests (although it does not prove) that there are no benefits." Id.; see also Posner, 
supra note 24, at 18. Posner would place on the government the burden of showing, "perhaps 
utilizing econometric methods," that the effect of the vertical restraint was to reduce the defen-
dant's output. Id. 
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Why would a television manufacturer's market share roughly 
double in the space of a few years? Some obvious explanations come 
to mind: (1) perhaps it developed a superior television, where for-
merly it had struggled along with sets that were inferior; (2) perhaps it 
had been able to lower its relative costs, maybe because larger compet-
itors had entered into unfavorable labor contracts, or perhaps because 
it was able to negotiate for low-cost production from abroad; or (3) 
perhaps a dominant firm in the industry had exited from the market or 
fallen on hard times. 
In fact, any one of these market changes could have had a much 
more substantial impact on Sylvania's market share than its adoption 
of a restricted distribution scheme. 218 The lesson to be learned here is 
not that restricted distribution is monopolistic or inefficient. It is 
probably efficient in most situations in which it is employed.219 How-
ever, a court cannot profitably engage in the simple device of compar-
ing market share before and after the restrictions took effect in order 
to determine the effects of the practice on competition or welfare -
not, at least, unless it can isolate and quantify all other variables that 
may have affected the defendant's market share. No court is likely to 
be capable of doing this.220 
B. The Problem of Strategic Behavior 
Strategic behavior is conduct designed by the actor to reduce the 
attractiveness of the offers against which it must compete.221 Not all 
218. In fact, the adoption of restricted distribution may be quite risky. Output fell after 
Arnold, Schwinn & Co. imposed vertical nonprice restraints. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn 
& Co., 388 U.S. 365, 368-69 (1967). The restraints in Schwinn were declared illegal per se, but 
that case was overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
Presumably, the loss of output in Schwinn was not a result of the restraints, but of Schwinn's 
changing competitive position in the market. In this case an aggressive rival, Murray Ohio Man-
ufacturing Co., surpassed Schwinn in sales. 
219. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 248-58; Hovenkamp, supra note 56. 
220. See note 214 supra. This is not to say that the static market fallacy is the exclusive 
prerogative of the Chicago School. On the contrary, very liberal United States Supreme Court 
Justices have been guilty as well. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 
(1969), in which Justice Douglas wrote for the Court that a price information exchange between 
competitors is illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act if the information exchange affects the mar-
ket price. To be sure, within the neoclassical market efficiency model a price information ex-
change could "affect" an equilibrium price either by facilitating collusion, or else by improving 
market information and causing price to stabilize. See Posner, Information and Antitrust: Re-
flections on the Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEO. L.J. 1187 (1979). However, a rule 
that requires a court to begin with price data and determine the degree to which those prices 
were affected by a price information exchange is hopelessly unrealistic, except in the most ex-
treme cases. ' 
221. The definition, used in a different context, comes from Markovits, supra note 23, at 44. 
See also Markovits, Some Preliminary Notes on the American Antitrost Laws' Economic Tests of 
Legality, 27 STAN. L. REv. 841 (1975). 
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strategic behavior is socially harmful, and much of it is competitive.222 
In general, however, strategic behavior is harmful and raises antitrust 
concerns when it reduces the attractiveness of the offers against which 
the strategizing firm must compete without producing substantial 
gains in productive efficiency to the strategizing firm.223 When so-
cially harmful strategic behavior is successful, the firm engaging in the 
behavior earns monopoly profits, and competitors (or potential com-
petitors) and customers pay the bill. 
The static market fallacy224 and the failure of orthodox Chicago 
School antitrust policy to take strategic behavior seriously225 are 
closely related weaknesses in the market efficiency model. Both errors 
result from the model's failure to appreciate time and change, and the 
havoc these factors play with the economist's idea of competitive equi-
librium, which exists nowhere in the real world, or at least not for 
long.226 
The fact that strategic behavior exists and that it can be anticom-
petitive is not particularly controversial.227 Far more controversial is 
the question whether antitrust policy should do something about 
harmful strategic behavior and, if so, what it is capable of doing given 
the limitations of the judicial process. One position, perhaps not irra-
tional, is to acknowledge that anticompetitive strategic behavior exists 
but to conclude that the issues are too complex to be dealt with in 
antitrust litigation.228 However, there certainly is no consensus among 
the courts that strategic behavior should be ignored.229 
Although anticompetitive strategic behavior can take a wide vari-
ety of forms, these forms may be roughly grouped into two different 
222. An example is product-improving research and development, which reduces the relative 
attractiveness of the offers against which the innovating firm must compete. 
223. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985), 
discussed at notes 308-18 infra. 
224. See text at notes 201-20 supra. 
225. See, e.g., McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 289 (1980); see also 
Baxter, supra note 22, at 315 (acknowledging that harmful strategic behavior may occur, but 
arguing that, at least for now, courts cannot do much about it). 
226. For some insights into the difficulties of measuring market power in markets that are 
not in equilibrium, see Pindyck, The Measurement of Monopoly Power in Dynamic Markets, 28 J. 
L. & EcoN. 193 (1985). 
227. See Baxter, supra note 22, at 316 (a Chicago School proponent acknowleding that stra-
tegic behavior occurs). 
228. See, e.g., Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 227, 230-36 (1st Cir. 
1983) (acknowledging that a price above average total cost might be "predatory" and thus an-
ticompetitive, but declaring such prices lawful in part because the judicial process is not capable 
of undertaking the relevant economic analysis). 
229. Though not explicitly identifying the targeted evil as "strategic behavior,'' courts have 
proscribed predatory pricing, which is a variant of such behavior. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TuR-
NER, ANTITRUST LAW~ 711 (1978). 
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categories. First, strategic behavior may include conduct that forces 
both the rival and the victims to sustain immediate losses. The con-
duct is profitable to the strategizing firm, however, because the strate-
gist anticipates that the victim will be driven out of the market or into 
submission, and that the strategist will then be able to reap monopoly 
profits. Such strategic conduct is necessarily temporary, for even the 
well-financed strategist will not maximize its profits by sustaining 
losses indefinitely. The large traditional literature and case law on 
predatory pricing is concerned with this kind of strategic behavior.230 
Most Chicagoans believe that true predatory pricing is at least rare; 
they are divided on the question whether it occurs at all.231 
The other kind of strategic behavior is immediately profitable to 
the dominant, strategizing firm. This behavior is generally initiated by 
the dominant firm or group of firms and is directed against smaller 
firms or, in some cases, potential entrants. The behavior is generally 
designed for one of two purposes. First, it may take advantage of irre-
versible investments made by fringe firms already in the market.232 
Second, it may force upon the smaller firms higher costs than the be-
havior imposes on the strategizing firm, although the behavior may be 
costly to the strategizing firm as well.233 In both cases the strategizer 
earns monopoly profits during the period in which such strategic be-
havior occurs. As a result, such behavior is profitable even if it lasts 
for an indefinite time.234 
Traditionally, antitrust policy has not only recognized strategic be-
havior, it has imagined a great deal of it that either did not exist or was 
in fact beneficial to the competitive process.235 In general, antitrust 
case law has classified illegal strategic behavior as either "predatory" 
- that is, directed at small firms already in the market236 - or else as 
230. The literature is summarized in H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 172-81. 
231. Those arguing that predatory pricing virtually never occurs include R. BORK, supra 
note 6, at 144-60; Easterbrook, supra note 77; McGee, supra note 225. A Chicago scholar who 
believes that predatory pricing may sometimes occur is Richard Posner. See R. POSNER, supra 
note 19, at 184-96. 
232. See text at notes 247-88 infra. 
233. See text at notes 289-307 infra. 
234. "Predatory" pricing at prices above average total cost - often accompanied by the 
strategic carrying of excess capacity - also fits into this category. See Baumol, Quasi-Perma· 
nence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979); 
Williamson, Predatory Pricing, supra note 23. 
235. The classic example is Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). 
See Hovenkamp & Silver-Westrick, Predatory Pricing and the Ninth Circuit, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
443, 462-63. 
236. See William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITI Continental Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 
(1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). 
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raising "barriers to entry" - that is, directed at potential rivals.237 
Some economists reject the distinction between strategic behavior 
directed at incumbents and that directed at potential entrants as not 
useful analytically.238 In one sense they are correct. When strategic 
behavior raises rivals' costs, it makes little difference whether these are 
costs of production or costs of entry.239 The effect in both instances is 
to shelter the strategist from competition. Nevertheless, the distinc-
tion is important for antitrust policy for a number of reasons. One 
reason has to do with the way that the antitrust laws are enforced. 
Although strategic behavior is often directed at potential entrants 
rather than actual competitors, and although the potential entrant is a 
much easier target for cost-raising strategies than the incumbent firm 
is, the courts have been extremely skeptical about claims brought by 
"precluded plaintiffs."240 Such plaintiffs allege they would have gone 
into business but for the inefficient exclusionary practices of an estab-
lished rival. 241 
Likewise, within traditional antitrust case law the well-developed 
but perhaps misguided242 concept of "barriers to entry" serves to dis-
tinguish the fringe firm already in the market from the firm seeking to 
enter. A properly defined barrier to entry generally protects all firms 
already in the market at the expense of the firm seeking entry. For 
example, a dominant firm that lobbies hard for a government-imposed 
cap on new entry (such as a maximum number of taxicab medallions) 
generally protects both itself and smaller competitors from new entry 
by outsiders. On the other hand, a dominant firm that employs an 
aggressive pricing strategy generally injures both established rivals and 
firms seeking entry. 
Much of the literature on strategic behavior has been concerned 
with predatory pricing243 and certain nonprice practices, such as prod-
uct innovation,244 which are sometimes alleged to be predatory. This 
writing is not surveyed here. Rather the discussion analyzes two kinds 
237. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affd. 
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). 
238. See Demsetz, supra note 74. 
239. A firm with no rivals at all, however, is still better off than a firm with high cost rivals. 
See Note, Standing at the Fringe: Antitrust Damages and the Fringe Producer, 35 STAN. L. REv. 
763, 769-73 (1983). 
240. See H. HovENKAMP, supra note 17, at 461-63. 
241. See, e.g., Neumann v. Vidal, 710 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Hayes v. Solomon, 597 
F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). 
242. See Demsetz, supra note 74. 
243. See note 230 supra. 
244. See Ordover & Willig, An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Inno-
vation, 91 Y~LE L.J. 8, 22-53 (1981). 
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of strategic behavior that are not yet well developed in the legal litera-
ture on antitrust policy. The two forms of strategic behavior have to 
do with the relationship between the credibility of threats and the sunk 
costs of either the dominant firm or the victim,245 and the strategy of 
raising rivals' costs.246 Although analysis of these strategies has not 
often appeared in the antitrust case law, both appear to be more sus-
ceptible to intelligent judicial analysis than predatory pricing is. Fur-
thermore, it is quite plausible that these strategies are commonly used. 
If that is the case, then the two strategies should play a much more 
dominant role in the antitrust litigation of the future, provided the 
litigation system is capable of handling their complexities. 
1. Sunk Costs and Credible Threats 
The neoclassical market efficiency model concentrates on (1) long-
run behavior, and (2) markets in which assets are freely transferable 
from one firm to another. In the real world, however, firms are often 
committed to short run investments in assets the costs of which cannot 
be fully recovered. This facilitates a great deal of monopoly pricing.247 
The market efficiency model tends to look at markets over the long 
run, over which they generally appear to behave competitively. The 
"long run" refers to a period that is sufficiently long that a firm can 
make the optimal choice about such questions as what size plant to 
build and where to build it.248 Over the long run, firms will tend to 
build plants of optimal size which are efficiently distributed through-
out the market. As a result, over the long run firms will be forced 
either to operate efficiently or to exit from the market. Likewise, over 
the long run, new firms will enter a monopolized market and bring it 
into competitive equilibrium.249 
In many markets, however, the long run is indeed very long. A 
steel mill or chemical plant can easily have a life expectancy of forty 
years, and may last much longer. In the real world, firms frequently 
do not have the luxury of dwelling exclusively on the long run. They 
245. See text at notes 247-88 infra. 
246. See text at notes 289-307 infra. 
247. Perhaps the best statement of this position is Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Inte-
gration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J, L. & EcoN. 297 
(1978). See also Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 
AM. EcoN. REV. 519 (1983). 
248. See E. MANSFIELD, supra note 151, at 194-201. 
249. Id. Professor Easterbrook suggests that the goal of the antitrust laws is to "speed up the 
arrival of the long run." Easterbrook, Limits, supra note 8, at 2. That language is largely rhetori-
cal, since the long run never "arrives." Perhaps more accurately, the economic goal of antitrust 
policy is to make short-run market behavior approximate long-run behavior as accurately as 
possible. 
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must deal with a previously made decision about plant size and loca-
tion. Often it is cheaper to operate the existing plant, in spite of possi-
ble inefficiencies, than to get rid of the plant and build one of a better 
size, or one that is located in a better place. 
Likewise, in the real world many fixed cost assets are not freely 
transferable from one firm to another. Firms must constantly deal 
with the problem of "sunk" costs - that is, costs that simply cannot 
be recovered if a firm exits from the market. Sunk costs should be 
distinguished from "fixed" costs or capital costs, which a firm must 
spend in entering a new market but which it will be able to recover 
when it decides to exit. Although sunk costs are usually fixed costs, 
many fixed costs are not sunk costs. Every entry into a new market 
entails a certain amount of sunk costs, although the extent of sunk 
costs varies greatly from one market to the next.250 
The extent of sunk costs depends on whether the firm exiting the 
market will be able to sell everything, including its good will, to a 
successor firm or whether it must take its productive capacity out of 
use entirely. For example, the restaurant owner who goes out of busi-
ness may be able to transfer everything to a successor, including his 
built-up investment in name recognition, if the successor assumes the 
previous firm's name, method of doing business, etc. If liquor licenses 
are not transferable, however, the old firm's expense in obtaining its 
initial liquor license will be sunk - that is, it will have to be borne by 
the original firm. At the other extreme, a firm that goes out of busi-
ness because it is poorly situated in a market with excess capacity may 
find that even its plant must be dismantled and sold for its salvage 
value. In that case, sunk costs may be substantial.251 
Although the impact of sunk costs is felt most strongly when the 
firm exits from a certain market, a rational firm will consider the ex-
tent of these costs when it makes a decision to enter. In short, the cost 
of exit from a market operates as a barrier to entry.252 In a market in 
which capital flows freely into profitable areas, the fact that it costs 
$10,000,000 to enter a certain market is not nearly as important as the 
250. The economic literature on sunk costs, fixed costs, and strategic behavior is growing, 
although much of it is very technical. See w. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & R. WILLIG, CoNTESTA-
BLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 280-82, 482-83 (1982); Baumol & 
Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q. J. EcoN. 
405 (1981). 
251. In this case sunk costs equal the unamortized cost of the plant, less the salvage value. 
252. See Dixit, The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence, 90 EcoN. J. 95 (1980); Eaton & 
Lipsey, Exit Barriers Are Entry Barriers: the Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry, 11 BELL 
J. EcoN. 721 (1980). 
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fact that only ten percent of those costs can be recovered if the invest-
ment proves unprofitable and exit becomes necessary. 
Likewise, the extent of sunk costs will influence a firm's decision 
about when to exit. For example, it is often said that a firm will con-
tinue to produce as long as it is covering its average variable costs, 
even if it is losing money because its earnings do not cover its fixed 
costs. The statement is true, however, only if the firm's fixed costs are 
'also sunk costs. 253 If the firm can exit the market by selling out to 
another firm willing to assume its entire capital commitment, then exit 
will be the best alternative any time business becomes unprofitable.254 
Dominant firms can make strategic use of sunk costs in two differ-
ent ways: (1) the dominant firm might take advantage of the sunk 
costs of smaller firms in order to obtain monopoly profits at their ex-
pense; or (2) the dominant firm might make sunk cost investments of 
its own in order to make its threats credible.255 Both strategies can 
result in extended periods of monopoly pricing. 
a. Strategy, vertical integration and sunk costs. As a basic premise, 
vertical integration is efficient and should not be of concern to the 
antitrust laws. However, occasionally vertical integration, or in some 
cases the absence of integration, may permit a firm to take strategic 
advantage of a vertically related firm's sunk costs. The result of such 
advantage taking can be a deadweight efficiency loss similar to the loss 
that results from exercises of monopoly power.256 
Certain vertical integration strategies, such as tying arrangements 
and exclusive dealing, permit firms to make the best use of or to mini-
mize the risk of sunk cost investments. For example, the firm plan-
ning to build a large plant may use exclusive dealing arrangements to 
guarantee a market for itself once its investment in a certain amount of 
productive capacity has been made. Such use of market-based vertical 
integration strategies is generally efficient insofar as it prevents other 
253. Sometimes fixed costs that are not sunk are referred to as "avoidable fixed costs." See 
D. MCCLOSKEY, THE APPLIED THEORY OF PRICE 282-83 (1982). 
254. For example, suppose that a firm's only capital asset is a general purpose delivery truck, 
whose fixed costs are amortized at $500 per month. Variable costs are $10 per hour. A firm 
operating the truck 100 hours per month with revenues of $12 per hour is covering its variable 
costs and contributing $200 to fixed costs. Continued operation in this case is "loss minimizing" 
- i.e., less costly than no operation at all. However, the firm is still losing $300 per month. If 
the firm can sell the truck to a different firm which is willing to assume the entire fixed cost 
liability, it will be even better off. 
If an asset is highly specialized, its owner is less likely to be able to sell it for its entire fixed 
cost. Thus, in general, the more specialized an asset is, the higher will be the percentage of sunk 
investment in it. 
255. See Williamson, Predatory Pricing, supra note 23. 
256. See text at notes 123-41 supra. 
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firms from taking advantage of the investor's sunk costs.257 However, 
the coin has another side. A firm may strategically take advantage of 
a vertically related firm's failure to guarantee its market by means of 
exclusive dealing arrangements or some alternative. One example of 
this is Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, 258 which is known to 
antitrust lawyers as a case that substantially emasculated section 2(±) 
of the Robinson-Patman Act.259 A&P was able to solicit a very low 
bid from Borden, one of its suppliers of dairy products, because Bor-
den had recently built a new plant nearby and would not be able to 
produce at capacity if it lost the very large A&P contract. In short, 
once the Borden plant was built, Borden inadvertently made itself a 
"captive" to A&P, which was able to take advantage of the situation 
by forcing a very low bid from Borden. 260 
The best solution in such cases may be to permit the market to 
discipline Borden for its short-sightedness. Next time it will guarantee 
its market, perhaps by exclusive dealing arrangements, before it makes 
a large commitment to a new plant. The market solution will not al-
ways work, however, because not every situation conducive to taking 
advantage of sunk cost commitments can be foreseen. Perhaps more 
importantly, if every one that could be foreseen had to be covered 
before investment would occur, there would be much less invest-
ment. 261 In such circumstances the antitrust laws can encourage effi-
257. See Marvel, Exclusive Dealing, 25 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1982); Williamson, Credible Com-
mitments, 29 A.NrrrRusr BULL. 33, 52-54 (1984). Firms may sometimes use tying arrangements 
in order to protect sunk cost investments. For example, see Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 
356 U.S. 1 (1958), in which the Supreme Court condemned under the Sherman Act an arrange-
ment by which Northern Pacific sold land close to its tracks using deeds containing covenants 
under which the grantee promised to ship over Northern Pacific's lines, provided that Northern 
Pacific's freight rates were competitive with those of other railroads. In this case Northern Pa-
cific had made a large sunk investment in a natural monopoly market (railroad lines). In general, 
multifirm competition in natural monopoly markets will drive prices down to a level that is 
insufficient to enable each firm to make a profit. The covenants effectively guaranteed that 
Northern Pacific could retain 100% of the freight business simply by matching the price of any 
new entrant. The result was to create a very powerful entry deterrence mechanism. No firm 
would want to be second entrant into a natural monopoly market if it knew that it always had to 
undersell a rival in order to obtain any business at all. 
258. 440 U.S. 69 (1979). 
259. The case held that a buyer could not violate the Robinson-Patman Act unless the seller 
had also violated it. Thus, if the seller could avail itself of the good faith "meeting competition" 
defense, the buyer could not be in violation of the statute, even if the differential pricing ("price 
discrimination," within the meaning of the statute) was caused by the buyer's misrepresentation. 
440 U.S. at 75-85. See H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 350. 
260. 440 U.S. at 73. For an analogous situation involving contractual agreements between 
General Motors Corp. and Fisher Body Co., see Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 247, at 
308-10. 
261. Arguably, such a rule would require complete vertical integration of all firms having 
sunk cost investments. Since all firms probably have at least some sunk costs, this could mean 
that virtually all of the enterprise would have to be organized into a single firm. 
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cient investment by protecting firms from strategic, inefficient 
advantage taking by others. 
Within the Chicago School model, vertical integration is virtually 
always efficient; it is harmful only if it facilitates collusion or perhaps 
price discrimination. 262 Since the laws against collusion can be used 
against the first of these, and since the second is very difficult for 
courts to analyze, many Chicago School writers have argued that all 
vertical integration should be legal. 263 
For example, the Chicago School has been extremely critical of 
Judge Hand's analysis inAlcoa264 of the price and supply "squeeze" by 
which Alcoa supposedly monopolized the market for aluminum.265 
The "squeeze," which was recently revived in Bonjorno v. Kaiser Alu-
minum & Chemical Corp., 266 was described by Judge Hand as a mech-
anism by which a vertically integrated monopolist might leverage 
additional monopoly profits by squeezing independent firms between 
high costs and low output prices. 267 
The allegation in both Alcoa and Bonjorno was that the vertically 
integrated monopolist produced raw aluminum ingot, some of which it 
fabricated itself and some of which it sold to independent fabricators. 
The monopolist allegedly sold the raw aluminum to the independent 
fabricators at a high price, but charged a low output price through its 
subsidiary fabricators for the fabricated product. As a result the in-
dependents were caught between the high price they had to pay for the 
raw aluminum and the low price they were able to collect for 
fabricated aluminum. 
The Chicago School critique of the price squeeze rests on a number 
of observations. First, why would a firm that presumably has the right 
to deal or refuse to deal as it pleases bother to use a price squeeze to 
injure independent fabricators? It could quite easily refuse to deal 
with independents and fabricate all of its aluminum itself. Second, the 
notion that the squeeze is profitable is simply another instance of the 
overused leverage theory that a monopolist can use its monopoly 
power in one market to obtain additional monopoly profits in a second 
market.268 However, as has been demonstrated many times, the mo-
262. See Bork, supra note 125; Easterbrook, supra note 1; Posner, supra note 106. 
263. See Bork, supra note 125; Easterbrook, supra note 1; Posner, supra note 106. 
264. United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1945). 
265. Cf. Bork, supra note 125, at 163-65 (criticizing Hand's "squeeze" doctrine as applied in 
United States v. Com Prods. Ref. Co., 234 F. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916)). 
266. Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 808-10 (3d Cir. 1984), 
petition/or cert filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 6, 1985) (No. 84-1907). 
267. 148 F.2d at 436-37. 
268. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 243-44. 
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nopolist of a single stage in a distribution system can obtain its full 
monopoly markup in that stage alone and will not enlarge its profits 
by adding another stage. This criticism applies equally to tying ar-
rangements and reciprocity, exclusive dealing, vertical mergers and 
the price squeeze, as well as other forms of vertical integration by the 
monopolist. 269 
Posner and Easterbrook argue that the price squeeze can reflect 
three different circumstances. The first is the existence of efficiencies 
on the part of the vertically integrated relationship: to the extent the 
market transaction between the aluminum manufacturer and the in-
dependent fabricator costs money, the fully integrated fabricators will 
be able to undersell the independent fabricators, which will have 
higher costs. Secondly, the squeeze may reflect Alcoa's efforts to 
break up a cartel of independent fabricators by vertically integrating 
into fabrication itself. Finally, the dual fabrication system may be a 
mechanism by which Alcoa engages in price discrimination. Posner 
and Easterbrook conclude that only the third of these phenomena 
raises any antitrust concerns.210 
Their analysis is based on the assumption that the assets of the 
independent fabricators are costlessly transferable.271 In fact, the 
price squeeze may often be a mechanism by which a monopolist takes 
advantage of a vertically related firm's sunk investment in order to 
force an infracompetitive rate of return on the firm - at the extreme, 
a rate of return sufficient to cover only the firm's average variable 
costs.272 In that case the monopolist will effectively transfer to itself 
the smaller firm's return on the fixed-cost part of its investment. The 
independent fabricator will not go out of business because production 
in this case produces fewer losses than shutdown would. 273 
269. See H. HovENKAMP, supra note 17, at 199 (vertical integration in general); id. at 222-
224 (tying arrangements and exclusive dealing). 
270. R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, supra note 77, at 874-75. 
271. Alternatively, this analysis may be based on the even more implausible assumption that 
the independent fabricators have no fixed costs. 
272. Plus the annualized salvage value of its fixed cost assets. See text at notes 250-51 supra. 
273. That is, assuming the firm is not forced into bankruptcy and shutdown. By pursuing 
this strategy, the monopolist will make more money than it would make by vertically integrating 
into fabrication itself. If it did that, it would have to recover its fixed as well as its variable costs. 
Effectively, the monopolist is transferring to itself that part of the independent fabricator's return 
that reflects the fixed cost investment. 
Suppose that a firm invests in land and a plant capable of producing 1,000,000 units of 
fabricated aluminum per year. Retirement of the fixed cost investment over the life of the plant 
requires an annual payment of $1,000,000 per year. The costs of the raw material, energy, labor 
and other variable cost items total $1.25 per unit. When the plant is operating at capacity it will 
be marginally profitable at a market price of $2.25 per unit - $1.00 per unit to cover fixed costs 
and $1.25 to cover variable costs. However, the firm will not shut down unless the market price 
drops below $1.25 per unit. The fixed costs must be paid whether or not the firm produces. If 
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In the long run, when the plant wears out, the independent 
fabricator faced with this dilemma will exit the market or relocate 
where the supply of raw material is more competitive. At that time the 
monopolist may vertically integrate into the market from which the 
independent exits. For the time being, however, the monopolist profits 
by taking strategic advantage of the independent's sunk costs. 
b. The Bonjorno case. The facts of the Third Circuit's recent de-
cision in Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. 274 suggest 
that the defendant took anticompetitive advantage of a buyer's sunk 
costs in order to facilitate collusion at the buyer's expense, while si-
multaneously forcing the buyer to accept infracompetitive returns. 
It is well known that various kinds of vertical integration can facil-
itate horizontal collusion at either the manufacturer (supplier) or the 
retailer (distributor) level.275 Most of the literature on the use of verti-
cal integration to facilitate collusion has focused on the conspirator's 
use of vertical new entry, mergers, territorial division and resale price 
maintenance. However, exclusive dealing probably facilitates horizon-
tal upstream collusion more effectively than resale price maintenance 
and perhaps more effectively than vertical nonprice restraints such as 
territorial division.216 
Collusion at the manufacturer level, whether express or tacit, can 
be frustrated if large, well-informed buyers force the colluders to com-
pete against each other by making various concessions.277 For exam-
ple, the OPEC cartel has been nearly undermined by the fact that most 
of its buyers are large and well informed and have been able to 
strategize their buying so as to keep individual OPEC members unin-
the market price drops to $1.50 the firm will still contribute twenty-five cents per unit to fixed 
costs and will "lose" $750,000 per year. However, if it ceases production it will be obligated to 
pay $1,000,000 per year. 
The strategizing firm, which operates in similar markets, can quite easily guess the amount of 
the victim's sunk costs. Furthermore, it does not need to rob the victim of all return on fixed 
costs. Any amount that it takes will be profitable. 
274. 752 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1984), petition for cerL filed, 53 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 6, 
1985) (No. 84-1907). 
275. See Hovenkamp, supra note 56; Liebeler, Intrabrand "Cartels" under GTE Sylvania, 30 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1982). 
276. The concern that vertical restraints, including exclusive dealing, can facilitate collusion 
is addressed in the Department of Justice Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 48 ANTITRUST & 
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) special supp. 3, 6 (Jan. 23, 1985). However, the guidelines do not 
distinguish the ways in which exclusive dealing might facilitate collusion from the ways in which 
vertical territorial division or resale price maintenance might accomplish the same end. See gen-
erally Marvel, supra note 257. 
277. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 141 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing 
this as a reason for not condemning alleged tacit collusion); H. HoVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 
107-09. 
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formed about what competitors are doing.278 
The cartel faced with disruptive buyers has a choice of strategic 
responses.279 First, it can eliminate the buyers by integrating verti-
cally into the buyers' production level. Such a strategy is expensive, 
however, and places the cartel members under the antitrust law of ver-
tical mergers, unless they integrate by new entry into the market 
where the disruptions are occurring. Integration by new entry can be 
disruptive of existing capacity, however, calling unnecessary attention 
to the cartel members' activities. 
The cartel members can eliminate the disruptive buyer problem by 
exclusive dealing with the established downstream firms. Under an 
exclusive dealing arrangement, each buyer has a requirements contract 
with a particular seller and will not be permitted to purchase from one 
of the other cartel members. The buyer obligated by the exclusive 
dealing arrangement is effectively prevented from forcing the members 
of the sellers' cartel to compete with one another. 
Such exclusive dealing will work, however, only if the buyer is 
agreeable to exclusive dealing. The buyer who knows that the exclu-
sive dealing is being used to facilitate collusion at the upstream level is 
not likely to be agreeable, because the upstream collusion will cut into 
its own profits. In that case, a certain amount of strategic behavior on 
the part of the upstream firm may be necessary. Such strategic behav-
ior will be possible if the buyer has substantial sunk costs in its own 
position in the product and geographic markets. 
The facts of the Bonjorno case were as follows: The aluminum in-
dustry was an oligopoly, with only a few major producers.280 These 
producers had facilitated tacit collusion by developing a scheme under 
which all of them manufactured raw aluminum, but each became the 
dominant firm with respect to a particular intermediate level alumi-
num product from which finished products were fabricated. In short, 
they engaged in tacit product market division. The defendant Kaiser 
was the dominant firm in the manufacture of aluminum coil and sheet, 
which is used to make aluminum pipe. The plaintiff was an indepen-
dent fabricator which purchased coil and sheet from the defendant 
and turned it into pipe. Because of the product division scheme, the 
278. See generally J. MARQUEZ, OIL PRICE EFFECI'S AND OPEC's PRICING POLICY: AN 
OPTIMAL CoNTROL APPROACH (1984). 
279. The theory that a disruptive buyer can frustrate cartelization is developed in the context 
of vertical merger policy in 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 229, at ~ 1006. See also 
Justice Department's 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note 36, at 26,836; P. AREEDA & H. 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at~ 1000.lb. 
280. Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 809 (3d Cir. 1984). 
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plaintiff was effectively dealing with a monopolist.281 
Defendant Kaiser also competed with the plaintiff in the 
fabrication of pipe by its wholly owned fabricators. The plaintiff al-
leged that Kaiser had imposed a classical price squeeze on the plaintiff 
by selling coil and sheet at a price so near the market price for finished 
pipe that profitable independent fabrication was impossible.282 Sec-
ondly, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant continually ordered the 
plaintiff to buy coil and sheet only from the defendant and threatened 
to build its own fabrication plant near the plaintiff's plant if the plain-
tiff should ever attempt to buy coil and pipe from one of the defen-
dant's competitors.283 Finally, when the plaintiff purchased aluminum 
from a competitor, the defendant carried out its threat and built a 
plant forty miles from the plaintiff's plant.284 
This strategy is quite plausible if the manufacturer is "best placed,' 
vis-a-vis the buyer - that is, if the buyer in an industry with high 
transportation costs is closer to the manufacturer than any other buyer 
is, thus giving the two firms a transportation cost advantage with re-
spect to one another. The strategy will work even better if the buyer 
has a specialized plant dedicated to the processing of the manufac-
turer's product. Because of the plant's specialized character, its sal-
vage value if taken out of that particular market is much less than its 
cost. The difference between the unamortized cost of the buyer's plant 
and its salvage value is a sunk cost which the manufacturer can use to 
its advantage. At the extreme, the monopoly manufacturer could 
force the buyer's margin down to a level sufficient to cover average 
variable costs plus the salvage value of the plant, without enough left 
over to cover fixed costs. In that case the monopolist will have devel-
oped a captive purchaser, who cannot move, cannot find an alternative 
supplier, and would lose even more money if it shut down.285 
Suppose, for example, that the plant has a cost of $1,000,000 per 
year and a salvage value of $200,000 per year. The average variable 
cost of fabricating the aluminum is $1500 per unit plus the price that 
the fabricator pays for the aluminum. The plant has a capacity of 
1000 units of aluminum per year. In order to be profitable when it is 
operating at capacity, the fabricator must obtain $2500 more than the 
wholesale price for the final product - $1500 to cover average varia-
ble costs and $1000 to cover fixed costs. 
281. 752 F.2d at 809. 
282. 752 F.2d at 810. 
283. 752 F.2d at 808. 
284. 752 F.2d at 808. 
285. See text at notes 271-73 supra. 
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However, the plant will not shut down unless its margin (the dif-
ference between the wholesale price and its output price) falls to an 
amount insufficient to cover the average variable costs plus the salvage 
value. Suppose that the monopolist manufacturer raises the wholesale 
price of ingot to the independent fabricator, while continuing to sell 
fabricated aluminum through its own fabricators at its profit-maximiz-
ing price. As a result the margin between the independent fabricator's 
wholesale price and its output price falls to $1800. In that case the 
fabricator will be losing money because the margin is insufficient to 
cover its total costs. Nevertheless, it will stay in production because 
the margin yields an annual amount equal to average variable costs 
plus $300,000, which is $100,000 more than the fabricator could ob-
tain by shutting down and salvaging the plant. 
The strategizing monopolist who knows that the independent 
firm's fabrication plant has a useful remaining life of, say, ten years, 
would engage in this price squeeze for ten years. Presumably at that 
time the independent fabricator would exit the market since it cannot 
make a profit, and the monopolist could build its own fabrication plant 
to serve that market. During the ten-year interval, the monopolist 
would pocket a substantial amount of the fabricator's annualized sunk 
costs.286 
The view that a monopolist can make strategic, inefficient use of a 
vertically related firm's sunk costs does nothing to undermine the 
traditional Chicago School notion that vertical integration is efficient 
and generally should not raise antitrust concerns. On the contrary, 
vertical integration generally eliminates such advantage taking, and 
this is one of the principal reasons that firms engage in vertical integra-
tion. 287 In this case the antitrust concern is caused, not by vertical 
integration, but by its absence. 
The manufacturer like that in the Bonjorno case, faced with 
fabricators unwilling to participate in exclusive dealing, might have to 
advance various credible threats in order to make the fabricators be-
lieve that de facto exclusive dealing was in their best interests. Since 
the fabricator's plants are already built, the threat to refuse to deal 
with a fabricator who bought from a competitor, and then to build a 
manufacturer-owned fabrication plant nearby, plus the well-publicized 
286. The evidence in Bonjorno indicated that the defendant used a pricing formula for in-
dependent fabricators tagged to the costs of its wholly owned fabricators. The formula generated 
a markup sufficient to cover "direct costs" of production, but insufficient to cover "corporate 
overhead." Bonjorno, 752 F.2d at 809-10. That language, while somewhat ambiguous about the 
economic costs at issue, suggests that the formula gave the plaintiff enough revenue to cover 
variable costs, but not enough to cover fixed costs as well. 
287. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 247. 
274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:213 
termination of one fabricator who failed to get the message, could cer-
tainly be effective.288 This would be particularly true if the supplying 
manufacturer were better placed to supply the independent fabricator 
than other manufacturers were. For example, if Kaiser is closer to 
Bonjorno's fabrication plant than any other aluminum manufacturer, 
Bonjorno should know that its own costs will go up if it can no longer 
purchase aluminum sheet and coil from Kaiser. More to the point, 
Bonjorno could not compete with a Kaiser-owned fabricator close by 
if the Kaiser-owned fabricator had the advantages of both any econo-
mies created by manufacturer ownership and a better-placed supplier 
(Kaiser) than Bonjorno had. Moreover, once Kaiser had built its own 
plant nearby, Bonjorno would be unable to recover the costs of its 
plant, except for the salvage value. Bonjorno would {ealize that its 
own interests required taking Kaiser's threat seriously and deal only 
with Kaiser. 
2. Raising Rivals' Costs 
An important kind of strategic behavior generally overlooked in 
antitrust literature, although recently addressed in economic writing, 
has been most aptly described as "raising rivals' costs."289 This behav-
ior is generally initiated by the dominant firm or group of firms and 
directed against smaller firms. It is designed to force upon the smaller 
firms higher costs than it imposes on the strategizing firm, although 
the behavior may raise the costs of the strategizing firm as well. The 
result is that the profit-maximizing output of the victims is decreased, 
and the strategizer can reap the benefit in higher prices or enlarged 
output. Importantly, the strategizer can earn monopoly profits during 
the period in which such strategic behavior occurs - in fact, often it 
will earn them only during the period in which the strategic behavior 
occurs. As a result, such behavior is profitable even if it lasts 
indefinitely. 
Since a relatively small amount of scholarship and virtually no liti-
gation has been devoted expressly to the problem of raising rivals' 
costs, it is difficult to say how often the strategy is pursued by domi-
nant firms or groups of firms, or what its welfare effects are. It is quite 
plausible, however, that the strategy is both common and quite harm-
ful to consumer welfare.290 In that case it should be an antitrust 
288. Kaiser might also build its own fabricating plant if Bonjomo's plant became obsolete or 
was nearing the end of its useful life. 
289. See Salop & Scheffman, supra note 23. 
290. That is, the strategy results in reduced output and higher prices. Salop and Scheffman 
offer a few generalizations about the welfare effects. Id. at 270. 
November 1985] After Chicago 275 
concern. 
There is an intuitive reason for thinking that strategic raising of 
rivals' costs is more common than predatory pricing. As a strategy, 
raising rivals' costs can be both more profitable and less risky than 
predation, and it can occur in a wider variety of markets. 291 Under 
traditional theories of predatory pricing292 a dominant firm attempts 
to dispatch a rival from the market by undergoing an indefinite period 
of below-cost selling in the hope that the victim will leave the market 
before the predator's resources are exhausted. Not only is this strat-
egy very expensive at the onset, but it is also seldom likely to be suc-
cessful. Even if the victim is forced into bankruptcy by the predatory 
pricing, it will sell its assets at a low price to a new firm who will 
maintain the victim's productive capacity on the market. 
Raising rivals' costs, on the other hand, does not involve an initial 
term ofloss selling to be followed by the mere likelihood of monopoly 
profits. The monopoly profits may flow in immediately. Furthermore, 
the strategy need not involve any event as cataclysmic (and therefore 
calculated to invite antitrust litigation) as the exit of a firm from the 
market. The market may look quite "normal," with relatively stable 
market shares and competitive profits earned by smaller firms, 
although dominant firms will earn more. 293 In fact, one of the greatest 
advantages of pursuing a strategy of raising rivals' costs is its subtlety. 
For all these reasons, but particularly because they are more likely to 
be successful, threats to raise rivals' costs may be more credible than 
threats to engage in predatory pricing. 294 
Finally, in many cases a strategy of raising rivals' costs will be 
profitable even if the market is not monopolized or not particularly 
conducive to monopolization or tacit price collusion. Tacit collusion 
with respect to activities that raise rivals' costs may be easier to 
291. There is general agreement that predatory pricing will work only in concentrated mar-
kets containing high barriers to entry and in which the predator is a dominant firm. See H. 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 179-84. 
292. It should be noted, however, that a substantial "predatory pricing" literature deals with 
nontraditional forms of predatory pricing - such as the strategic construction of excess capacity 
in industries subject to economies of scale, which facilitates so-called "limit pricing." In such 
cases the victims of the predatory pricing are generally firms that would like to enter the 
predator's market, but have not yet done so. See Salop, supra note 23; Williamson, Predatory 
Pricing, supra note 23. Other scholarship is summarized in H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 17, at 
175-79. 
293. Evidence that dominant firms are earning higher profits than fringe firms can be found 
in a variety of markets. Such evidence may imply no more than that the market is subject to 
economies of scale, although it generally suggests a certain amount of collusion, whether express 
or tacit, on the part of the dominant firms. See Weiss, The Structure-Conduct-Performance 
Paridigm and Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1104, 1115-19 (1979). 
294. See Salop & Schelfman, supra note 23, at 267. 
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achieve than tacit collusion respecting price or output. Furthermore, 
such tacit collusion may work quite well in markets that do not have 
natural entry barriers that make them conducive to tacit collusion. In 
fact, one effect of raising rivals' costs may be to create artificial entry 
barriers. 
For example, an industry dominated by three or four firms and 
containing a competitive fringe might be in a position either to engage 
in self-regulation or to petition the government for certain forms of 
regulation.295 In that case the dominant firms might easily reach a 
tacit understanding regarding their support for a regulation, compli-
ance with which is subject to economies of scale. Each dominant firm 
acting alone will know that the effect of the regulation will be to leave 
its position unchanged vis-a-vis the other larger firms but will dispro-
portionately raise the costs of fringe firms and perhaps the entry costs 
for potential rivals. 
The notion that dominant firms can strategically manipulate the 
costs of rivals may change some of our ideas about price behavior in 
concentrated markets.296 Within the classical theory of oligopoly the 
"price leader" is generally a dominant firm in the market. A fringe 
firm would not make a good price leader because it would be unable to 
make credible threats against other fringe firms who cut price. Such 
threats are unnecessary, however, if no fringe firms are likely to cut 
price because their own costs are higher than those of the dominant 
firm. In that case it may work to the advantage of a dominant firm to 
permit one or more fringe firms to be the price leader(s). The high 
cost fringe firms will set a price sufficient to cover their costs, and the 
low cost dominant firm can earn monopoly profits and retain its mar-
ket share simply by matching the fringe firm's pricing. 
Consider the following strategies: 
(1) The dominant firm files litigation against a nondominant com-
petitor. This could be patent or other intellectual property litigation, 
regulatory litigation, or litigation of virtually any other kind. The liti-
gation forces the two firms to spend roughly equal amounts, but it is 
much more costly to the smaller firm, for the costs are distributed over 
a smaller output. 291 
(2) The dominant firm or group of firms petitions the government 
295. See text at notes 298-302 infra. 
296. For the traditional Chicago School theory, see R. BORK, supra note 6, at 179-96; R. 
POSNER, supra note 19, at 42-47. 
297. See, e.g., MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); National Cash Register Corp. v. Arnett, 554 F. Supp. 1176 (D. 
Colo. 1983). Other cases are discussed in Annot., 71 A.L.R. FED. 723 (1985). 
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or a regulatory agency for a procedure or fee that will cost both domi-
nant and nondominant firms the same absolute amount to implement. 
The effect is that the compliance cost per unit is higher for the 
nondominant firm. Importantly, the petition need not be for a re-
quirement that will have an impact only on the nondominant firm (as 
when a railroad petitions the government for stricter regulations for 
truckers).298 A large trucker might petition the government for 
stricter regulations for all truckers, including itself. It might profit 
from the adoption of such a rule if compliance is cheaper per unit of 
output for large firms than it is for small firms. Today it is well estab-
lished that substantial economies of scale obtain for compliance with 
certain types ofregulation.299 A dominant firm would do well to cam-
paign for such regulation, for the result would be to impose dispropor-
tionately higher costs on smaller firms. 
(3) Alternatively, a trade association that engages in self-regulation 
or self-evaluation of products and that is dominated by a few large 
firms might adopt a product standard compliance with which is sub-
ject to substantial economies of scale. The result is that the smaller 
firms' costs rise disproportionately to those of the larger firms. Once 
again, such a standard need not be "discriminatory."300 The standard 
will raise the costs of smaller firms disproportionately even though it is 
applied uniformly to all members of the trade association. This activ-
ity, unlike the petitioning activity described above, is not sheltered by 
an antitrust "exemption" for strategic use of governmental 
processes.301 Such discrimination against smaller firms may be com-
298. See Eastern RR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 
(1961); Session Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., [Current] ANTrrRusr & TRADE REG. REP. 
(BNA) No. 1250, at 185 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 1986); see also Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 
496 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (dismissing a complaint that the defendant airline had peti-
tioned Congress to deny favorable federal loans to the plaintiff competitor). 
299. The literature on the relationship between firm or plant size and the costs of regulatory 
compliance is quite extensive. See Curtis, Trade Policy to Promote Entry with Scale Economies, 
Product Variety, and Export Potential, 16 CANADIAN J. EcoN. 109 (1983); Hovenkamp & Mack-
erron, Municipal Regulation and Federal Antitrust Policy, 32 UCLA L. REv. 719 (1985); Malo-
ney & McCormick, A Positive Theory of Environmental Quality Regulation, 25 J. L. & EcoN. 99 
(1982); Neumann & Nelson, Safety Regulation and Firm Size: Effects of the Coal Mine Health 
and Safety Act of 1969, 25 J. L. & EcoN. 183 (1982); Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental 
Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1984); see also Bartel & 
Thomas, Direct and Indirect Effects of Regulation: A New Look at OSHA's Impact, 28 J. L. & 
EcoN. 1 (1985) (finding economies of scale in OSHA compliance). 
300. Many complaints involving alleged refusals to deal or boycotts by trade associations 
engaged in standard setting have charged that the association discriminated against the plaintiff 
in the creation or application of the standards. See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas 
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). Likewise, most courts have identified the absence of 
such discrimination as a basis for dismissing the complaint. See, e.g., Eliason Corp. v. National 
Sanitation Found., 614 F.2d 126 (6th Cir.), cert. denied. 449 U.S. 826 (1980). 
301. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-72 (1965) (even 
anticompetitive petitioning of the government is exempt from antitrust scrutiny); Eastern R.R. 
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mon within trade associations. Several cases, some quite recent, sug-
gest that precisely this has been occurring. 3oz 
( 4) The dominant firm engages in a form of advertising that must 
be met by the smaller firms. In order to preserve their market shares 
each of the smaller firms must engage in a similar amount of advertis-
ing, which will give each of them the same amount of advertising ex-
pense as the large firm. However, for the smaller firms the expenses 
will be distributed over a much smaller amount of output.303 
(5) A dominant firm researching a new product and knowing that 
it will be the first entrant, intentionally selects a technology in which 
economies of scale are substantial, knowing that the fringe firms will 
have to follow along. 304 
At this time someone - particularly someone from the Chicago 
School - might object that many if not all of the illustrations given 
above show nothing more than economies of scale. Furthermore, 
economies of scale are efficient - they result in higher output and 
lower prices. 
As a general rule economies of scale are efficient and ought to be 
encouraged; however, it is now well established that scale economies 
can be used strategically for inefficient purposes. In fact, a large part 
of the strategic entry deterrence/predatory pricing literature is dedi-
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (same). See generally P. 
AREEDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note SS, at ch. 2; Annot., 71 A.L.R. FED. 723 (1985) (dis-
cussing cases dealing with the so-called "sham" exception to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine). 
302. The existence of economies of scale in compliance with the rules of a trade association 
has not been an issue in such antitrust cases. As a result, reported opinions do not generally 
provide information concerning such economies. Nevertheless, it is possible to infer such dis· 
crimination against smaller firms in Structural Laminates, Inc. v. Douglas Fir Plywood Assn., 
261 F. Supp. 154 (D. Ore. 1966), ajfd., 399 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 
(1969). Other possible examples include Moore v. Boating Indus. Assns., 754 F.2d 698 (7th 
Cir.), vacated, 106 S. Ct. 218 (1985), where the administrative "runaround" given a small firm in 
the association seemed calculated to injure smaller firms; and United States v. Realty Multi-List, 
Inc., 629 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1980), which involved a real estate multiple listing service operated 
for member realtors. See also American Socy. of Mechanical Engrs. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 
U.S. 556 (1982) (involving a firm that had brought suit against its competitors and against a 
90,000-member professional society). 
A related instance of strategic raising of the costs of rivals is discussed in Williamson, Wage 
Rates as a Barrier to Entry: The Pennington Case in Perspective, 82 Q. J. EcoN. 85 (1968), 
concerning the litigation in United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). William-
son argues that in this case dominant, capital-intensive firms sought or approved a wage contract 
calling for higher wages, knowing that the competitive fringe was more labor intensive and would 
feel the consequences of such a contract much more sharply. 
303. Salop & Scheffman, supra note 23, at 268. 
304. This may have happened in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980). 
Salop & Scheffman, supra note 23, at 268, also argue that the vertical price "squeeze" dis-
cussed at notes 265-88 supra could be used by a vertically integrated firm to raise the costs of an 
unintegrated rival, although they do not specify precisely how this might occur. However, such a 
squeeze could be used to decrease the unintegrated rival's price/cost margin, at least where the 
rival's sunk costs are substantial. 
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cated to this phenomenon. 305 
Furthermore, to concentrate on economies of scale in the above 
examples misses the point. A cost is a cost, no matter how efficient the 
firm that pays it. In the above cases the market would be more com-
petitive if the cost at issue did not have to be encountered at all. That 
is, the relevant issue is not who is the most efficient payer of these 
particular costs, but whether the costs would exist at all in a competi-
tive market. 
For example, the creation by trade associations of regulations, 
compliance with which is subject to economies of scale, is inefficient 
not because of the existence of the scale economies, but because the 
regulation itself is inefficient. It has been adopted by the dominant 
firms in the association because although it will raise everyone's costs, 
it will raise the unit costs of smaller rivals more than it raises their 
own.306 
An antitrust policy effective against strategic raising of rivals' costs 
has yet to be designed. Certain barriers, such as the constitutional 
protection given to firms to petition the government for inefficient reg-
ulation, 307 appear to be insurmountable in some areas. However, in 
most areas conduct alleged to raise rivals' costs in order to facilitate 
supracompetitive pricing should be subject to traditional rule-of-rea-
son analysis. There are some problems, however, particularly if a 
court is asked to determine whether an ambiguous act is efficient. For 
example, if a trade association is charged with intentionally adopting a 
regulation subject to compliance economies of scale in order to raise 
rivals' costs, the obvious defense in marginal cases (i.e., where the reg-
ulation is not clearly unreasonable) is that the regulation itself is effi-
cient. The court would then need to determine whether the regulatory 
goal could be achieved in a less anticompetitive way. If the answer to 
that question is no, the court still may have to determine whether any 
efficiencies obtained from the regulation are greater than the offsetting 
305. See, e.g., Baumol, supra note 234; Salop, supra note 23; Williamson, Predatory Pricing, 
supra note 23. 
306. The Chicago School position that all truthful advertising is efficient misses this point as 
well. See R. Boru::, supra note 6, at 314-20. Advertising is subject to substantial economies of 
scale, because the costs of reaching a given number of potential consumers in a given media are 
fairly constant, and therefore must be divided over the output of the firm doing the advertising. 
(For example, a thirty-second prime time television commercial costs General Motors and Amer-
ican Motors the same amount, even though General Motors' output is five times higher.) As a 
result, if a large firm faces a smaller rival and the smaller firm must meet the larger firm's adver-
tising in order to maintain its own market share, the larger firm will choose a rate of advertising 
larger than it would if its rival were the same size. The result will be to give the rival higher per 
unit costs. Robert Bork's argument, id. at 315, considers only excessive advertising that he re-
gards as "predatory" - that is, as imposing immediate losses on the firm engaged in it. 
307. See note 301 supra and accompanying text. 
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losses. Judicial analysis of such allegations may require resort to evi-
dence of the defendants' intent. 
3. Strategic Manipulation of Shared Markets: The Aspen Case 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 308 illustrates a 
variation of the problem of strategic behavior by a monopolist, calcu-
lated to raise its rival's costs. The plaintiff (Highlands) and the de-
fendant (Ski Company) operated skiing facilities at the four skiing 
mountains in Aspen, Colorado, a popular ski resort. The defendant 
operated three of the mountains and the plaintiff operated the fourth. 
For many years the defendant and plaintiff had engaged in a joint ven-
ture under which they marketed a lift ticket that a purchaser could use 
at all four of Aspen's mountains. Initially, revenue from the joint tick-
ets was divided on the basis of actual use of the slopes, with the plain-
tiff's share of the revenues averaging about sixteen percent.309 Later, 
the defendant refused to participate in the joint scheme unless the 
plaintiff agreed to accept a fixed percentage of ticket revenues that was 
lower than the percentage reflecting actual use of the plaintiff's moun-
tain. After a few years of controversy over how revenues should be 
divided, the defendant refused to participate any longer in the joint 
scheme. After that, the plaintiff attempted to market its single-slope 
lift ticket separately, but its market share steadily declined.310 
The plaintiff sued, alleging that the defendant had illegally monop-
olized the market for downhill skiing services at Aspen. The specific 
exclusionary practices alleged were that the defendant: (1) used its 
dominant market share to impose a fixed revenue percentage under the 
joint ticket scheme that was lower than the percentage of the market 
actually controlled by the plaintiff; (2) refused to participate further in 
the joint venture with the intent or knowledge that the plaintiff would 
be injured thereby; (3) subsequently marketed and advertised its own 
three slopes in such a way as to create the impression that the Aspen 
area contained only the defendant's three slopes; (4) agreed with vari-
ous tour operators to sell its tickets to the ex~lusion of plaintiff's tick-
ets; and (5) refused to accept the plaintiff's ticket coupons in exchange 
for customer access to the defendant's slopes. 
In affirming a judgment against the defendant, the Supreme Court 
observed that entry into the market for skiing services at Aspen was 
308. 105 s. Ct. 2847 (1985). 
309. 105 S. Ct. at 2847. 
310. 105 S. Ct. at 2851. 
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restricted by both geography and regulatory obstacles.311 As a result, 
future growth in the Aspen market was unlikely. Second, most skiers 
strongly preferred a multi-slope lift ticket to a single-slope ticket. Fur-
thermore, most preferred a four-slope ticket to a three-slope ticket.312 
This latter fact is important, for it indicates that market demand 
under the joint venture was greater than it was when each firm was 
selling its ski lift tickets separately - i.e., assuming that the relative 
market shares of the two firms remained constant, both firms would 
have benefitted from the selling of a joint lift ticket covering all four 
slopes. The effect of Ski Company's refusal to participate in the joint 
venture was twofold: (1) overall demand in the market dropped, be-
cause the best deal available in the market was a three-slope ticket 
instead of a four-slope ticket; and (2) Ski Company's share of the mar-
ket increased, because it offered a three-slope ticket, which was far 
more attractive to skiers than Highland's single-slope ticket.313 
Since the total market for Aspen skiing would be larger under the 
joint venture, why did Ski Company refuse to participate? There are 
two likely answers.314 First, Ski Company may have thought that de-
mand for its three-slope ticket would be sufficiently greater than de-
mand for the plaintifi's single-slope ticket that the plaintiff would be 
driven out of business. More likely, however, Ski Company believed it 
would make more money even though total market demand was de-
clining, because its share of that market would increase substantially. 
311. 105 S. Ct. at 2850. There is good reason to believe, however, that the market was 
defined too narrowly. See P. ARE.EDA & H. HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at~ 534.1. 
312. This is simply another way of saying that the demand curve for a four-slope ticket was 
to the right of the demand curve for a three-slope ticket, which was in turn to the right of the 
demand curve for a single-slope ticket. See Aspen, 105 S. Ct. at 2859-60. 
The evidence in the Aspen case suggests, although it does not fully establish, that the market 
for Aspen skiing was a natural monopoly, assuming that it was a relevant market at all. A 
natural monopoly is a market in which costs decline as output increases all the way to the point 
that demand in the market is saturated when price equals marginal cost. As a result, a firm that 
controlled 100% of the market would encounter lower costs than any firm that controlled less 
than 100%. There is no evidence that the costs of administering the Aspen slopes declined as the 
number of slopes controlled by a single firm increased. However, the evidence does indicate that 
a firm that marketed the four slopes together faced lower marketing costs in proportion to the 
number of buyers than any firm that marketed fewer than four slopes. A natural monopoly 
controlled by a single firm will generally yield monopoly pricing unless it is regulated. The 
unattractiveness of those two alternatives - monopoly pricing or price regulation - suggests 
that the most efficient way to run the market for Aspen skiing would be to permit multiple firms 
to operate the slopes, but permit a joint venture that would market the four slopes together. 
However, the market would then have to be watched carefully because of its obvious potential for 
collusion. 
313. 105 S. Ct. at 2853. 
314. The defendant raised a third possibility: an antitrust action that had been filed against 
the two companies alleging that the joint ·venture was collusive. However, at the time of this 
litigation the companies had signed a consent decree which expressly permitted the joint venture. 
105 S. Ct. at 2851 n.9. 
282 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:213 
This prediction turned out to be correct: Highland's share of the mar-
ket declined substantially after the joint venture fell apart and the de-
fendant's share increased.31s 
The Aspen case is an example of strategic behavior that both raised 
a rival's costs disproportionately to those of the defendant316 and re-
duced the relative attractiveness of the rival's market offering while 
simultaneously producing no efficiency gains to the defendant. In fact, 
the defendant's offering also became less attractive than it was prior to 
the strategic behavior, but not by as wide a margin as the plaintiff's. 
The conduct was "predatory;" however, its success did not require the 
defendant to sustain short-term losses in order to receive long-term 
gains. The gains accrued almost immediately. 
The difficult problem raised by the Aspen case is how a court is to 
determine when behavior that raises a rival's cost, or that reduces the 
relative attractiveness of a rival's market offering, is anticompetitive 
and worthy of condemnation under the antitrust laws. The Supreme 
Court cited two convincing pieces of objective evidence: (1) contrary 
to the defendant's representations, the joint venture scheme was rela-
tively easy to administer;317 and (2) participation in the joint venture 
would have been the more profitable alternative for the defendant,3ts 
except on the premise that refusal to participate would increase the 
defendant's relative market share at the expense of the plaintiff's. 
The Supreme Court held that the jury was entitled to find from 
these facts that the defendant had intended to monopolize the market. 
In fact, one of the most significant features of the decision is the in-
creased weight that the Supreme Court assigned to the jury's fact find-
ing, particularly to the jury's ability to infer anticompetitive intent in 
monopolization cases. 
Unfortunately, the facts of the Aspen case made the decision too 
easy, and probably exaggerate a court's ability to determine whether 
inefficient monopolizing conduct has occurred without using evidence 
of intent. In a monopolization case the plaintiff must show that the 
defendant had monopoly power and that it engaged in one or more 
315. 105 S. Ct. at 2853. 
316. More accurately, the defendant's actions reduced the spread between the plaintifrs costs 
and the demand curve that it faced. Its costs were undoubtedly raised absolutely as well - for 
example, Highlands probably had to engage in more advertising in order to keep its market share 
from falling even faster than it did. Strictly speaking, actions that raise a rival's costs move its 
average cost curve (or perhaps marginal cost curve) upward; in this case, the actions moved the 
rival's demand curve downward. The effect in any case is the same: reduced output by the rival. 
317. 105 S. Ct. at 2860·61. 
318. 105 S. Ct. at 2859. 
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inefficient "exclusionary practices."319 Many of a monopolist's prac-
tices are exclusionary; however, they may also be efficient. For exam-
ple, the monopolist's research and development that yields a new 
product is exclusionary, because it injures the monopolist's rivals. At 
the same time, such conduct is legal because it makes consumers better 
off.320 
An important difference between efficient and inefficient exclusion-
ary practices in monopolization cases is that the former enlarge total 
market output, while the latter reduce it. 321 Both, however, enlarge 
the market share of the monopolist at the expense of its rivals. The 
Aspen case is a rare instance in which the Supreme Court was able to 
determine that the monopolist's conduct reduced overall market de-
mand without committing the static market fallacy. In most cases the 
conduct's effect on the market is likely to be ambiguous, and evidence 
of intent may be essential. 322 
The strategic manipulation of the market that occurred in Aspen, 
like strategic raising of rivals' costs and taking advantage of competi-
tors' sunk costs, illustrates the inadequacy of Chicago School theory to 
account for important real-world behavior. That firms can engage in 
such behavior to extract monopoly profits undermines the reliance 
placed on the market by Chicago School antitrust theory and suggests 
that antitrust policy based on that theory will fail to achieve efficient 
results. 
CONCLUSION 
The Chicago School of antitrust analysis has made an important 
and lasting contribution to antitrust policy. The School has placed an 
emphasis on economic analysis in antitrust jurisprudence that will 
likely never disappear. At the same time, however, the Chicago 
319. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see also Aspen, 105 S. Ct. 
at 2854 n.19. 
320. See, e.g., California Computer Prod. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 744 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(refusing to condemn technological innovation by a monopolist); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman 
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980) (same). 
321. For example, efficient research and develpoment by the monopolist either improves a 
product, thus shifting its demand curve to the right, or else reduces its costs. In both cases the 
effect is higher total market output. However, all the increases in market output accrue to the 
monopolist, in addition to sales that the monopolist steals from competitors. On the other hand, 
inefficient exclusionary conduct - for example, obtaining a patent by means of fraud - neither 
improves the product nor reduces its costs. The only result is that competitors are excluded. 
Total market output declines when the monopolist increases price. 
322. That is, in a real world market a court could not consider whether a monopolist's al-
leged exclusionary practice increased or decreased total market demand, for the relevant infor-
mation would not be available. See the discussion of the static market fallacy at notes 201-20 
supra. 
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School's approach to antitrust is defective for two important reasons. 
First of all, the notion that public policymaking should be guided ex-
clusively by a notion of efficiency based on the neoclassical market 
efficiency model is naive. That notion both overstates the ability of the 
policymaker to apply such a model to real world affairs and under-
states the complexity of the process by which the policymaker must 
select among competing policy values. 
Second, the neoclassical market efficiency model is itself too simple 
to account for or to predict business firm behavior in the real world. 
The model has proved to be particularly inept at identifying many 
forms of strategic behavior. In large part this is so because the market 
efficiency model is static and dwells too much on long-run effects. In 
the real world, short-run considerations are critical to business plan-
ning. Furthermore, the short run can be a very long time. In many 
industries a monopoly that lasts only for the short run can inflict great 
economic loss on society. By ignoring the short run, the market effi-
ciency model fails to appreciate the social cost of many forms of mo-
nopolistic behavior. 
The willingness to take short-run, strategic behavior seriously 
comes with a price, however. An economic theory that includes such 
behavior becomes far more complex than the neoclassical model. 
Under more complex models information becomes more ambiguous 
and more difficult to interpret. When that happens, the value of eco-
nomic models begins to diminish in relative importance. In short, 
once the model becomes more complex, the policymaker necessarily 
relies on values that lie outside the model. The result is an antitrust 
policy that will always have a noneconomic, or political, content. 
